Obligation to disclose HIV-positive status to all sexual partners
A number of years ago, a man in Canada was diagnosed with HIV (AIDS).
Shortly thereafter; he attended a counselling session where he was informed of
his obligation to disclose his HIV–positive status to all his sexual partners
before having sex with them.
He had sexual intercourse with
two women at various times after he knew that he was HIV-positive and there was
no dispute that he knew knew that he was HIV–positive during that time period.
At the time of his sexual encounters with the two women, he had been given two
separate probation orders requiring him to “keep the peace and be of good
behaviour”. Breach of those orders could result in a sentence of incarceration
for aggravated assault.
Unfortunately, the two women
didn’t know that the man they were having sex with was HIV-positive so they let
him insert his penis into their bodies. Further, he didn’t use a condom with
the first woman and one time out of five times he was having sex with the other
woman, he didn’t use a condom. Even then, he had to inform his sexual partners
that he was HIV-positive. If he didn’t ejaculate, then that wouldn’t be a medical
problem for the women but if he did ejaculate, then it is possible that the two
women could get AIDS also.
While he was driving one of
the women home after having sex with her, he was pulled over by the police for
a driving infraction and the officer recognized the man and asked the woman if
she had unprotected sex with him and she said that she did. He told her that he
was HIV-positive and advised her to go to a hospital and be tested. She was
tested and it was determined that she hadn’t contracted the disease. Despite
that, the police laid a charge of aggravated sexual assault against her
HIV-positive sexual partner.
He met another woman and he
didn’t use a condom on the first time of five times he was having sex with her.
She learned about his HIV-positive status after watching a TV newscast about
him and subsequently she reported him to the police. The police then laid another
charge of aggravated sexual assault against him. She too hadn’t contacted the
HIV disease.
On the evidence accepted by
the trial judge of the Superior Court in which he was tried, the Crown
established that the appellant was HIV–positive, that he failed to disclose his
HIV–positive status to two women prior to having intercourse with them and that
he failed to use a condom on some of the occasions in question. He was
sentenced to a term in prison.
Through his lawyer, he
appealed both the two convictions and the sentences. The grounds for his appeal
were as follows:
First, the appellant submitted
that there was no evidence at trial relating to the risk of HIV transmission,
either generally or specifically, in relation to the alleged sexual acts at
issue in this case. In the absence of such evidence, the appellant said
that the Crown (prosecutor) failed to submit a successful argument that
required a response on the part of the defence.
Second, the appellant contended
that the trial judge proceeded from a finding of unprotected sex when the
appellant was HIV–positive to a finding that, in effect, concludes that
unprotected sex with a person who is HIV–positive itself raises a realistic
possibility of HIV transmission, such that the requirement of deprivation or
risk of deprivation is made out. This conclusion, the appellant argued,
runs contrary to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s previous findings in the Mabior case.
That case was a very
interesting one. Mabior clarified the law when the court ruled that
sexual intercourse with an HIV–positive person poses a significant risk of
serious bodily harm” only where there is a “realistic possibility of
transmission of HIV.
Was there a significant risk that
the appellant could transmit the disease to a sexual partner if he didn’t use a
condom? The
appellant essentially contended that since there was no medical or expert
evidence regarding the degree of risk of HIV transmission posed by the
appellant’s specific sexual acts with the two women, there should not been a
conviction against him. His lawyer
argued that since there was no evidence one way or another that gave rise to a
realistic possibility of the transmission of HIV especially if he possibly had
a low count of the HIV virus, he should have been acquitted of those charges.
Further,
his lawyer argued that the fact that the two women didn’t get the virus after
he had unprotected sexual intercourse with them was proof that his insertion of
his unprotected penis into the women was no risk to the women. Thus, the
appellant’s lawyer submitted that the Crown had failed to establish a prima
facie case of deprivation or risk of deprivation, namely, a realistic
possibility of HIV transmission.
Before I go any further, let me compare that
argument with another. What if a person points a firearm at another person when
there is no bullet in it? Section 87.(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code states that without lawful excuse, it is
illegal to point any firearm at another person whether it is loaded or not. Now
there is a very good reason why pointing an unloaded firearm at someone is a
serious offence. Such an event could place a victim of such an act into a state
of terror.
Does it not follow that if a sexual partner of another who is
HIV-positive doesn’t know that her partner has that disease and only learns of
it later after the unprotected sex act has been completed, that the unsuspecting
partner could go through a period of deep concern wondering if she now has the
same disease that the other partner might have given to her? This is why it is
imperative that persons who are HIV-positive are required by law to inform
their sexual partner that he or she is HIV-positive. The choice of having sex
with the other person is then based on whether or not the person with the HIV
virus is going to use a condom.
This is what one of the jurists on the Ontario Court of Appeal said
about our main protagonist in this article.
“In
my view, his argument is unsustainable. On the appellant’s reasoning, any
case that differs from the precise factual makeup considered in Mabior
would require expert evidence to establish a baseline infection risk. Mabior
does not suggest that expert evidence of the basic risk of HIV transmission for
intercourse will be required in every case to ground a conviction for
aggravated sexual assault arising from unprotected acts of intercourse, anal or
vaginal, with an HIV-positive partner. Rather, Mabior holds that a
realistic possibility of transmission of HIV is negated by evidence that condom
protection was used and the accused’s viral load was low at the time of
intercourse.” unquote
The Crown rightly argued in Mabior
that to establish whether a particular sexual act posed a significant risk of
transmitting HIV would typically require the Crown to call expert evidence as
to the accused’s viral count at the time of the offence as well as risks
associated with any condom protection used. Of course that would be impossible
since the appellant would have hardly then gone to the hospital immediately
after he had sex with each of the women to obtain a viral count. And asking for
a viral count just prior to his trial would be meaningless since it could easily
change in the interim.
The jurist in the Ontario
Court who wrote the decision for the other two jurists said in their decision
“It follows, in my opinion,
that once it was established in this case that: (1) the appellant was
HIV–positive; (2) the appellant did not disclose his HIV–positive status prior
to intercourse with the appellants; (3) the complainants would not have engaged
in sexual activity with the appellant had they known of his HIV–positive
status, and (4) the appellant failed to use a condom on the relevant occasions
of intercourse, the Crown had established a prima facie case of a
realistic possibility of HIV transmission. On the Mabior standard,
even if the evidence had established that the appellant had a low viral load at
the time of intercourse with (the two women) a realistic possibility of HIV
transmission would not have been negated. I therefore conclude that the
appellant’s appeal from his aggravated sexual assault convictions should be
dismissed.” unquote
The man then had to finish his sentence in prison.
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