Egypt file. (Part 1) The collapse of a dictator’s reign

Hosni Mubarak was expected to announce his resignation. The Egyptian military expected it. The people of Egypt expected it. The new head of his ruling party pleaded to him face-to-face to do it. But despite more than two weeks of massive demonstrations by protesters unmoved by lesser concessions, the president still hung on.

Mubarak’s top aides and family—including his son Gamal, widely viewed as his intended successor—told his father that he could still ride out the turmoil. So the televised resignation speech that the rest of Egypt had expected became a stubborn and ultimately humiliating effort to cling to power. It only enraged the protesters throughout Egypt. Soon after, the military moved decisively.

Here is an initial picture of what happened in the hours before Egypt’s dictator of nearly 30 years finally resigned.

Mubarak was unable, or unwilling, to grasp that nothing less than his immediate departure would save the country from the chaos generated by the protests that began on January 25th. According to a senior government official, Mubarak lacked the political machinery that could give him sound advice about what was happening in the country.

"He did not look beyond what his son, Gamal was telling him, so he was isolated politically," said an official. "Every incremental move by Mubarak was too little too late."

The military, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed vice-president, to end the protests. The unrest was spiraling out of control with demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and even gun battles engulfing almost the entire nation.

Insiders spoke of infighting among cabinet ministers over how great a threat the demonstrators posed, and of deliberate attempts by close aides, including Gamal Mubarak, to conceal from the president the full extent of what was happening on the streets.

The insiders who spoke to the Associated Press included a senior Egyptian official, editors and journalists from state newspapers close to the regime who have spent years covering Mubarak’s presidency, retired army generals in contact with top active duty officers, senior members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and analysts familiar with the machinations of Mubarak’s inner circle.

Their account of the events showed that the military became concerned soon after the protests began. They said it was the military that persuaded Mubarak to appoint Suleiman as vice-president — the first since Mubarak took office in 1981 and place him in charge of negotiations with opposition groups on a way out of the standoff.
Suleiman failed on that score. Later he was reduced to threatening the people that a coup would replace the negotiations if no progress was made. Leaders of the protests vowed not to negotiate until Mubarak was gone, even after he promised that he would not seek another term in September and further promised reforms to reduce poverty, end the repressive emergency laws and make Egypt more democratic. Obviously, no one believed him. By then, nearly everyone had expected Mubarak to resign, including the military.

Hossam Badrawi, a stalwart of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, met with Mubarak and later told reporters that he expected the Egyptian leader to meet the people’s demands and step down later the same day. After Mubarak did not, Badrawi, who had been named the party’s secretary general a few days earlier, resigned in protest, according to two party insiders.

Meanwhile, the military’s highest executive body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, met without its chairman, Commander-in-chief Mubarak, and issued a statement recognizing the ‘legitimate’ rights of the protesters. They called the statement "Communique No. 1," in a language that in the Arab world suggests that a coup was taking place.

Insiders said Mubarak’s address was meant to be his resignation announcement. Instead, he made one last desperate attempt to stay in office after being encouraged to do so by close aides and especially by his family.

It’s obvious as to why his aides and his family wanted Mubarak to remain in office. If he resigned, they would be nobodies after that and in fact, may even be subjected to prosecution at a later date.

Mubarak finally got the message that everyone was trying to convey to him. “Get out or else.” Omar Suleiman, the vice-president, announced in a televised address that the president was "waiving his office”, and had handed over his authority to the Supreme Council of the armed forces.

Suleiman's short statement was received with a roar of approval and by celebratory chanting and flag-waving from a crowd of hundreds of thousands in Cairo's Tahrir Square, as well by pro-democracy campaigners who attended protests across the country, not to mention the millions elsewhere in Egypt.

The crowd in Tahrir chanted "We have brought down the regime", while many were seen crying, cheering and embracing one another. I believe that the armed forces were pleased that it was the people of Egypt who brought down Mubarak because if they failed in that endeavor, then the army would have to bring him down in a coup—which probably would have been bloodless in any case.

Mohamed ElBaradei, an opposition leader, hailed the moment as being the "greatest day of my life", in comments to the Associated Press news agency." He said, “The country has been liberated after decades of repression. Tonight, after all of these weeks of frustration, of violence, of intimidation—today the people of Egypt undoubtedly feel they have been heard, not only by the president, but by people all around the world.”

"The sense of euphoria is simply indescribable." said one correspondent at Mubarak's Heliopolis presidential palace, where at least ten thousand pro-democracy activists had gathered.

The moment of his resignation was not only about Mubarak stepping down; it is also about people's power to bring about the change that no-one thought possible.

In Alexandria, Egypt's second city, a correspondent described an "explosion of emotion". He said that hundreds of thousands were celebrating in the streets.

Pro-democracy activists in the Egyptian capital and elsewhere had earlier marched on presidential palaces, state television buildings and other government installations on the 18th consecutive day of protests.

At the state television building earlier in the day, thousands had blocked people from entering or leaving, accusing the broadcaster of supporting the current government and of not truthfully reporting on the protests.

The military stood aside while people were flooding through a gap where barbed wire has been moved aside.

It is ironic when you think about it. It was one man alone that made all of this happen. Without him, President Mubarak would still be in power and the people of Egypt would not have protested in the streets and squares of Egypt like they did. The irony of this is that the man wasn’t an Egyptian. He was a Tunisian. I am speaking of an ordinary fruit peddler.

The riots in Tunisia that brought down the Tunisian dictator, Ben Ali began soon after when police seized a young fruit vendor’s cart and in retaliation; he publicly burned himself to death. From that moment on, the people of Tunisia took to the streets and remained there until their president resigned. The people of Egypt decided—if it could work in Tunisia, it could work in Egypt and as we all know, it did.