Protecting our diplomats
I am sure that the vast
majority of people around the world were shocked when they learned of the fatal
attack by a mob of Libyans on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya on
September 12, 2012. Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans were killed as
a direct attack on the Consulate which was part of a wave of assaults on U.S.
diplomatic missions in Muslim countries because of their anger at the showing
of a silly low-budget movie made in the United States that denigrates the Prophet
Muhammad. However, those leading the mob that attackled the US consulate in Benghazi were terrorists who planned the attack ahead of time.
Although the militias, which are the legacy of the revolutionary brigades that fought Gadhafi in the civil war have taken on roles as security, guarding state facilities and neighborhoods, they also are accused of acting like gangs, detaining people, intimidating critics and clashing in the streets.
What is
really shocking is that the Libyan government didn’t have any members of the
Libyan army or police outside the Consulate protecting the Consulate and the
people inside it. The small number of Libyan security forces that were at the scene
withdrew because they were heavily outnumbered and outgunned. The government
should have brought in more of army soldiers and police to the Consulate so
that as a group, they wouldn’t be outgunned.
Guards and Philippine police’s
Special Forces carrying assault rifles were outside the US embassy on September
13th, along with a pickup truck bearing a machine-gun that was
parked under a nearby tree. Now if they had that kind of firepower outside the Consulate
in Benghazi, the four men in
the Consulate wouldn’t have been killed by the mob.
The 1961
and 1963 Vienna Conventions of Diplomatic
Relations and Consular Relations, are the principle agreements on the protection of
international officials. Article 22 of
the 1961 Convention says in part;
1.
The premises of
the mission shall be inviolable.
2 The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
Libya was a signatory to
that 1961 Convention and yet, it failed to adhere to those two sections of
Article 22 of that Convention.
After a series of
political kidnappings in Latin America, the Organization
of American States in 1971 drafted an agreement with respect to the
protection of diplomats from terrorism.
The countries in Latin America that signed the agreement pledged to cooperate
amongst themselves to prevent and punish terrorists who harm diplomats.
The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (also referred to as the Protection of Diplomats Convention) was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14th of December
1973. It is one of a series of sectoral
anti-terrorism conventions negotiated within the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. It built on the codification conventions in the field of
privileges and immunities, including the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
A particular difficulty (as with other
anti-terrorism conventions) arose over the question of national liberation
movements. The solution eventually found was to include a paragraph in the
resolution adopting the Convention (resolution 3166 (XXVIII)), in which the
General Assembly considered that its provisions “could not in any way prejudice
the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence, in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States by
peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation,
racial discrimination and apartheid. This was acceptable because it could be
read as not purporting to make any exception to the crimes covered by the Convention or to qualify in any way the
obligations assumed by States parties to the Convention. Strangely enough, the Assembly decided that the
resolution should be published together with the Convention.
In a speech given by Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of States on September 14th
2012, she said;
“The people of Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia did not trade the tyranny of a dictator for the tyranny of a mob. Reasonable people and responsible leaders in these countries need to do everything they can to restore security and hold accountable those behind these violent acts. And we will keep taking steps to protect our personnel around the world.” unquote
This raises an
interesting question. “Why were there no US security personnel in that
Consulate in Benghazi when the
mob attacked it?” If there had been, and they fired machine guns at those who
were attempting to enter the Consulate, I doubt the mob would have got very far
into the building; certainly not with ten or more of their fellow thug’s bodies
lying on the ground ahead of them.
While it is true that the
primary responsibility for protection of diplomats lies with the host country,
the United States through the State Department’s Office of Security, uses
marines known as Marine Security Guards to provide additional protection for
diplomatic outposts. Originally they protected the buildings and the secured
locations for the secret codes but as the years progressed and terrorism raised
its ugly head, the role of the marines became more directed towards the person
el of the embassies and consulates.
Kenneth W Knauf, a past
assistant director of the State Department’s Office of Security said in 1973, when
speaking of foreign governments protecting diplomats in their countries; “The
problem is if they give extra protection to America diplomats, they will have
the entire diplomatic community screaming for more protection too.”
Consequently, the US government
took steps on its own to strengthen protective security abroad. They brought in
more follow cars with radios installed in them, contingency plans for quick
response to terrorist attacks, additional security officers and Marine guards, amongst
other improvements.
Knauf also said that terrorism
would end in about four years. He was wrong by almost forty years. In my
opinion, it is going to be a very long time before terrorism finally comes to
an end. This is why the US and other nations should take greater cautions to
protect their diplomats, their staff and families and the buildings also.
The protection of diplomats
cannot be separated from the broader problems of terrorism throughout the
world. Many of the incidents of terrorism are traced to the bitter, explosive
and ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli relations with the
Palestinians and because the Americans have been supporters of Israel for
decades (and correctly so) the problems are intensified.
The late Dr. George Habash, who
was the head of the terrorist organization, the ‘Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine’, articulated an interesting philosophy of his at a
1970 revolutionary symposium held in North Korea when he said in part;
“There can be no political or
geographical boundaries or moral limits to the operations of the people’s camp.
In today’s world, no one is innocent, no one is neutral.” unquote
This kind of megalomaniac form of statement trying to justify terrorism strains
the authorities in trying to control it and it is only very recently that the
need to increase the protection of diplomats and their staff and embassies and
consulates has become absolutely necessary.
As an interesting
aside, the word `diplomacy` is relatively recent as far as history is
concerned. It is derived from the Greek word, ‘diploma’ which in Greek literally
means, folded papers used for state charters and licences. However, the concept
of diplomacy is as old as civilization itself. Distrust of foreigners was
almost universal back then so it was necessary to permit envoys to remain in
the various foreign countries and as to be expected, the protection of them had
to be observed. The republic of Venice was among the first to establish
permanent missions in rival city-states and it also maintained envoys in
France, Spain and Switzerland.
In 1975 while I was at the
United Nations Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, giving an address on
terrorism, I had several meetings with Faisal Ouida, who was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer
to the United Nations. Canada was
concerned about the safety of the participants of the upcoming Olympic Games
that was to be held in Montreal, Canada in 1976. The Canadian government had
previously stated that it would not talk with the PLO and yet it was deeply
concerned that the terrorist organization, the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine’ would
commit further acts of terrorism at the Games in 1972 like they did when they
killed the Israelis during the Games in Munich four years earlier. I got a
commitment from the PLO that they would do what it could to prevent a
recurrence of that happening again. I in turn promised the PLO that they could
have an office in Ottawa, the capital of Canada in three years time if they
kept their word. The PLO kept its word and the Canadian government kept my
word. Three years later, the PLO had a representative in their office in
Ottawa. Just before the commencement of the First Gulf War with Iraq, the Iraqi
dictator, Saddam was holding Canadian hostages. The Canadian government asked
the PLO representative in Ottawa to speak to Arafat who was the chairmen of the
PLO and who was also a friend of Saddam. They wanted Arafat to speak on
Canada’s behalf to Saddam to get the hostages out of Iraq. He was successful
and the hostages were permitted to return to Canada. I have brought these two events to your
attention because at the time I was negotiating with Faisal Ouida, I was acting
as an ordinary citizen and not officially as a delegate to the UN and Faisal
Ouida was acting as an ordinary citizen, negotiating with me on behalf of the PLO
and as such, he too was not a delegate in the UN headquarters acting officially
for the Palestinians. It is a common practice for ordinary citizens to be asked
to negotiate settlements because they can speak unofficially in case something
goes wrong.
Of course, I didn’t need
protection from the PLO but when I was in Milan addressing a UN conference in
1985 about what I thought should be done with terrorists once they are
captured, my speech was broadcasted all over Italy and published in newspapers
world-wide so there was some considerable concern about my safety. The Italian
army that was in charge of the security of the delegates and the experts (as we
are called by the UN) decided to have me tailed by a member of the army who was
armed and in plain clothes to make sure that no harm came to me while I was in
Milan.
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