Police stings used to get confessions
I don’t see anything wrong for the police to use stings to get
confessions from suspects as long as they don’t cross the line. Unfortunately,
there have been instances when the police not only crossed the line, they
actually trampled on it.
Take the instance when the police in San Francisco used a really
obnoxious sting to get Barbara Graham to confess to participating in the strangling
of an elderly lady while she and her two male friends were robbing her. According
to the movie of her life, the police sent in an undercover police officer
posing as a lawyer. She told him everything. Her confession resulted in her and
the others being executed in the gas chamber at the San Quentin penitentiary.
Actually, in real life, that sting didn’t happen that way as the movie was a
fictional account of her life.
There was a sting used to get her to confess however. It was used in a different manner. Apparently she offered another
inmate $25,000 to hire a friend in order to provide an alibi. The inmate
however, was working in league with an undercover policeman in order to reduce
her own vehicular manslaughter sentence. The officer
posed as the inmate’s ‘boyfriend’ and told Graham that he was willing to say
that he was with her the night of the murder, if she admitted to him that she
was actually at the scene of the crime. The officer recorded the conversation.
This attempt to suborn perjury, as well as her
confession that she was at the scene, destroyed Graham's credibility in court.
She and her two companions were subsequently executed in the gas chamber on
January 3, 1955. The inmate who helped set up the sting was immediately
released as time already served. There was absolutely nothing improper with
that sting especially since Graham instigated it herself.
Many years ago, the Toronto Police had captured two criminals who were
partners in a crime but neither would confess. The police forged a confession
of one of the men and showed it to the other man who then confessed to the
crime. At their trial, the judge was incensed that such a forgery was used in
the sting since forgery is against the law in Canada and not even the police
can use a forged document to obtain a confession. The men were acquitted of the
crime since there was no other evidence available to the prosecution.
This does not mean that the police in Canada cannot use a sting to
obtain a confession from a suspect. That was decided in a recent Supreme Court
of Canada decision with respect to a sting that was used by the RCMP in
Newfoundland in which the sting was referred to as “Mr. Big”—a typical sting
that has been used by the police in Canada 350 times since the early
1990s.
The sting was used to get a so-called confession out of a man who was
suspected of purposely drowning his two three-year-old twin daughters in a lake
in Newfoundland on August 4, 2002.
The police immediately suspected that Nelson Hart
was responsible for his daughter’s deaths. They didn’t believe his explanation
that he went into an epileptic fit when he saw them struggling in the water. Unfortunately
they lacked the evidence needed to charge him with the crime of first degree
murder. They decided to use a sting to elicit a confession from him. The sting was the Mr. Big sting that has been commonly used in the past by various
police forces in Canada and the United States.
Hart was unemployed and socially isolated. He rarely left home and when he did, he was in the company of his
wife. He also only had a grade five education so he was vulnerable to be unknowingly conned by the police to become
part of a criminal enterprise with the promise that being part of that
enterprise would make him a lot of money.
After he was recruited to the organization, he worked with the
undercover officers and was quickly befriended by them which made him happy to
have friends who liked him.
Over the next four months, he
participated in 63 “scenarios” with the undercover officers and was paid more
than $15,000 for the work that he did for the organization. As part of
that work, he was also sent on several trips across Canada such as Halifax, Montreal,
Toronto and Vancouver. He often stayed in hotels and occasionally dined
in expensive restaurants during these trips, all at the fictitious
organization’s expense. Over time, the undercover officers became his
best friends and he came to view them as his brothers. According to one
of the undercover officers, during this time frame, Hart made a bald statement
in which he confessed to having purposely drowned his daughters.
The second so-called confession came about
as a direct result of the introduction of Mr. Big. His
meeting with Mr. Bigt was akin to a job interview between Hart and Mr. Big
who was the man purportedly at the helm of the criminal organization.
During their meeting, Mr. Big interrogated Hart about the death of his
daughters, seeking a confession from him. After initially denying
responsibility, Hart confessed to drowning his daughters. Two days later,
Hart went to the scene of the drowning with an undercover officer and explained
how he had pushed his daughters into the water. He was arrested shortly
thereafter. This sting cost the taxpayers $4134,000.
At trial, Hart’s three confessions
were admitted into evidence. The trial judge denied Hart’s request for
permission to testify with the public excluded from the courtroom. A
majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Hart’s appeal and ordered a new
trial. That was because the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the
trial judge erred in refusing to allow Hart to testify outside the presence of
the public. A majority of the court also concluded that the Mr. Big
operation had breached Hart’s right to silence under section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The majority excluded
two of Hart’s confessions, the one to Mr. Big and the one to the
undercover officer at the scene of the drowning. However, the majority
concluded that Hart’s bald earlier confession was admissible and ordered a new
trial. The Crown (prosecution) appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The justices in that court concluded that the Mr. Big technique came at a price. They
agreed that suspects who confess to Mr. Big during pointed interrogations
in the face of powerful inducements and sometimes veiled threats and this raises
the spectre of unreliable confessions. Unreliable confessions provide compelling
evidence of guilt and present a clear and straightforward path to
conviction. In other contexts, they have been responsible for wrongful
convictions; a fact that the justices couldn’t ignore.
The court also recognized that Mr. Big
confessions were also invariably accompanied by evidence that showed Hart
willingly participated in “simulated crime” and was eager to join a criminal
organization. The court said that this kind of evidence sullies the
accused’s character and, in doing so, carries with it the risk of unfair prejudice.
In my opinion, it is almost tantamount to entrapment by the police.
Experience in Canada and
elsewhere teaches us that wrongful convictions are often traceable to evidence
that is either unreliable or at least, prejudicial. When the two combine,
they make for a potent mix and the risk of a wrongful conviction increases
accordingly. Wrongful convictions are a blight on our justice
system. Our courts must take reasonable steps to prevent them before they
occur.
Mr. Big operations also
run the risk of becoming abusive. Undercover officers provide their
targets with inducements, including cash rewards, to encourage them to
confess. They also cultivate an aura of violence by showing that those
who betray the criminal organization are met with violence. There is a
risk these operations may become coercive. Thought must be given to the
kinds of police tactics we, as a society, are prepared to condone in pursuit of
the truth.
Under existing law,
Mr. Big confessions are routinely admitted under the party admissions
exception to the hearsay rule. Attempts to extend existing legal
protections to Mr. Big operations have failed. The Supreme Court has held that Mr. Big operations do
not engage the right to silence because the accused is not detained by the
police at the time he or she confesses. And the confessions rule which
requires the Crown to prove an accused’s statement to a person in authority is
“voluntary” is inoperative because the accused does not know that Mr. Big
is a police officer when he confesses. The law as it stands today provides
insufficient protection to accused persons who confess during Mr. Big
operations.
The court said that a
two-pronged response is needed to address the concerns with reliability,
prejudice and police misconduct raised by these operations. The first prong
requires recognizing a new common law rule of evidence. Under this rule,
where the state recruits an accused into a fictitious criminal organization and
seeks to elicit a confession from him, any confession made by the accused to
the state during the operation should be treated as presumptively
inadmissible. This presumption of inadmissibility is overcome where the
Crown can establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the probative value of
the confession outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Let me give you an example of
the probative value of the confession outweighing its prejudicial effect.
Probative evidence can be submitted as evidence in court by
the prosecutor for the purpose of proving something that is important in a
trial. Probative value of proposed evidence must be weighed against any form of prejudice in the minds of jurors towards a criminal
defendant. If that kind of evidence
would unfairly mislead the jurors, then it can’t be used.
The probative value of a
Mr. Big confession is a function of its reliability. In assessing
the reliability of a Mr. Big confession, the courts must first look to the
circumstances in which the statement was made. These circumstance
include—but are not strictly limited to the length of the operation, the number
of interactions between the police and the accused, the nature of the
relationship between the undercover officers and the accused, the nature and
extent of the inducements offered, the presence of any threats, the conduct of
the interrogation itself, and the personality of the accused, including his or
her age, sophistication and mental health. The question for the trial
judge is whether and to what extent the reliability of the confession has been
called into doubt by the circumstances in which it was made.
After considering the
circumstances in which the confession was made, the court should look to the
confession itself for markers of reliability. Trial judges should
consider the level of detail contained in the confession, whether it leads to
the discovery of additional evidence, whether it identifies any elements of the
crime that have not been made public, or whether it accurately describes
mundane details of the crime the accused would likely not know had he or she
not committed it. Confirmatory evidence is not a hard and fast
requirement, but where it exists, it can provide a powerful guarantee of
reliability. The greater the concerns raised by the circumstances in which
the confession was made, the more important it will be to find markers of
reliability in the confession itself or the surrounding evidence.
Weighing the prejudicial effect
of a Mr. Big confession is far more straightforward and a familiar
exercise. Trial judges must be aware that admitting Mr. Big
confessions creates a risk of moral and reasoning prejudice. With respect
to moral prejudice, the jury learns that the accused wanted to join a criminal
organization and committed a host of “simulated crimes” that he believed were
real. Moral prejudice may increase with operations that involve the
accused in simulated crimes of violence, or that demonstrate the accused has a
past history of violence.
As for reasoning prejudice which
is defined as the risk that the jury’s focus will be distracted away from the
charges before the court, it too can pose a problem depending on the length of
the operation, the amount of time that must be spent detailing it, and any
controversy as to whether a particular event or conversation occurred.
However, the risk of prejudice can be mitigated by excluding certain pieces of
particularly prejudicial evidence that are unessential to the narrative, or by
the judge providing limiting instructions to the jury.
In the end, trial judges must
weigh the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the confession at issue
and decide whether the prosecutor has met its burden. Because trial
judges, after assessing the evidence before them, are in the best position to
conduct this exercise, their decision to admit or exclude a Mr. Big
confession will be afforded considerable regard on appeal.
Justice Moldaver of the
Supreme Court said that this new common law rule of evidence goes a long way
toward addressing the concerns with reliability, prejudice, and police
misconduct that are raised by Mr. Big operations. He said that it
squarely tackles the problems with reliability and prejudice. In
addition, it takes account of police misconduct both by placing the
admissibility onus on the prosecutor and by factoring the conduct of the police
into the assessment of a Mr. Big confession’s probative value.
However, the common law rule of
evidence he proposed does not provide a complete response to the problems
raised by Mr. Big operations. On its own, it might suggest that
abusive police conduct will be forgiven so long as a demonstrably reliable
confession is ultimately secured.
The second prong of the
response fills this gap by relying on the doctrine of abuse of process.
The doctrine of abuse of process is intended to guard against state misconduct
that threatens the integrity of the justice system and the fairness of
trials.
Trial judges must be aware that
Mr. Big operations can become abusive. It is of course impossible to
set out a precise formula for determining when a Mr. Big operation will
reach that threshold. But there is one guideline that can be
suggested.
In conducting an operation, the
police cannot be permitted to overcome the will of the accused and coerce a
confession. This would almost certainly amount to an abuse of
process. While violence and threats of violence are two forms of
unacceptable coercion, operations can become abusive in other ways.
Operations that prey on an accused’s vulnerabilities, such as mental health
problems, substance addictions, or youthfulness, can also become unacceptable.
The trial judge did not apply
this two pronged framework in determining the admissibility of Hart’s
confessions. Nor did the parties address it in the courts below or before
this Court. Nonetheless, this Court is in a position to decide whether
the respondent’s confessions were properly admitted. Although a new rule
has emerged, the issues have not changed: the reliability of H’s confessions,
their potential for prejudice, and the conduct of the police in carrying out
this Mr. Big operation have been in issue from the outset. The
parties have addressed these issues, and there is a substantial record before
us. These proceedings have also been difficult and protracted. More
than a decade has passed since H’s daughters died. Ordering a new trial
and leaving the admissibility of H’s confessions to be determined by a new
trial judge would be tantamount to sending this case back to square one.
That would not be in the interests of justice.
Justice Moldaver said, “The
trial judge did not apply this two pronged framework in determining the
admissibility of Hart’s confessions. Nor did the parties address it in
the courts below or before this Court. Nonetheless, this Court is in a
position to decide whether the respondent’s confessions were properly admitted.
Although a new rule has emerged, the issues have not changed: the
reliability of Hart’s confessions, their potential for prejudice, and the
conduct of the police in carrying out this Mr. Big operation have been in
issue from the outset. The parties have addressed these issues, and there
is a substantial record before us. These proceedings have also been
difficult and protracted. More than a decade has passed since Hart’s
daughters died. Ordering a new trial and leaving the admissibility of Hart’s
confessions to be determined by a new trial judge would be tantamount to
sending this case back to square one. That would not be in the interests
of justice.” unquote
Applying the new common law
rule to the three confessions attributed to Hart, it is apparent that their
probative value does not outweigh their prejudicial effect. At the time
the operation (sting) began, Hart was unemployed and socially isolated.
The operation had a transformative effect on his life, lifting him out of
poverty and providing him with illusory friendships. These financial and
social inducements provided Hart with an overwhelming incentive to confess
either truthfully or falsely. He may have made a false confession as a sign of
bravado in order to impress Mr. Big.
The three confessions themselves don’t
actually contain any markers of reliability that are capable of restoring faith
in their reliability. The confessions contain internal contradictions,
and there is no confirmatory evidence capable of verifying any of the details
contained within the confessions. When the circumstances in which Hart’s
confessions were made are considered alongside their internal inconsistencies
and the lack of any confirmatory evidence, their reliability and his guilt is
left in serious doubt.
On the other hand, these
confessions like all Mr. Big confessions carried with them an obvious
potential for prejudice. The jury heard extensive evidence that for four
months Hart had devoted himself to trying to join a criminal organization and
that he repeatedly participated in what he thought were criminal acts. It
is easy to see how the jury could come to view Hart with a certain degree of disdain.
Here was a man who bragged about killing his three-year-old daughters to gain
the approval of criminals. The potential for prejudice in these
circumstances was extremely significant.
The Justice said, “On balance,
the Crown (prosecutor) has not met its onus. The probative value of Hart’s
confessions does not outweigh their prejudicial effect. Put simply, these
confessions are not worth the risk they pose. It would be unsafe to rest
a conviction on this evidence. It is accordingly unnecessary to decide
whether the police conduct amounted to an abuse of process.”
Having excluded Hart’s
confessions from evidence, it is doubtful whether any admissible evidence
remains upon which a jury, properly instructed and acting reasonably, could
convict Hart of murder. However, the final decision on how to proceed
rests with the Crown.
Justice
Cromwell said in his response to the above, “There is agreement with the
majority’s analysis of the legal framework that ought to apply to statements
obtained from accused persons as a result of Mr. Big operations.
However, the admissibility of Hart’s statements to the undercover officers
ought to be determined at a new trial where the judge and the parties would
have the benefit of the new framework set out in the majority’s reasons.” unquote
Justice
Karakatsanis said, “Confessions to state agents raise particular dangers for
the criminal justice system. The very structure of Mr. Big
operations creates circumstances that (1) compromise the suspects’
autonomy, (2) undermine the reliability of confessions, and (3) raise
concerns about abusive state conduct. Yet, Mr. Big confessions are
not caught by the traditional rules governing confessions to the state, such as
the confessions rule or the right to silence. The common law rule
proposed by the majority fails to consistently take into account broader
concerns that arise when state agents generate a confession at a cost to human
dignity, personal autonomy and the administration of justice. The
principle against self-incrimination, under s. 7 of the Charter, provides comprehensive
and flexible protection in such circumstances.” unquote
The principle against
self-incrimination provides the appropriate analytical framework for several
reasons. First, Mr. Big operations directly engage the individual
privacy, autonomy and dignity interests that the principle is meant to
protect. Second, this approach draws on existing jurisprudence concerning
the principle against self-incrimination, making it unnecessary to create a new
rule. Third, the principle provides an opportunity to weigh intertwined
concerns about reliability, autonomy and state conduct together in a nuanced
way. Finally, it addresses suspects’ rights both during the operation and
also at trial.
This court in R. v. White said, “There are four factors for
determining whether the principle against self-incrimination has been violated
by the production or use of a suspect’s statements: adversarial relationship;
coercion; reliability; and abuse of state power. While these factors
should be considered together, each emphasizes a particular legal interest.” unquote
The onus will be on the accused
to establish a prima facie (at first sight) that there exists a breach
of the principle against self-incrimination. To do so, the accused must
show that concerns about autonomy, reliability, and police conduct exist, as
they will in nearly every Mr. Big operation. In such circumstances,
the burden will shift to the Crown to establish that there is no breach
whatsoever.
As concerns the first factor,
the relationship between Hart and the state was adversarial. As in any
Mr. Big operation, the police deliberately set out to obtain a confession
from him. As for the second factor, coercion is primarily concerned with
the autonomy and dignity of the suspect and asks whether the suspect had a
choice to speak to the authorities. There will almost always be some
degree of coercion in a Mr. Big operation. The court should
consider: the magnitude and duration of the operation; any explicit or implied
threats used; any financial, social or emotional inducements applied; and the
characteristics of the suspect, including any mental, physical, social or
economic disadvantages. This approach protects the autonomy of the
suspect.
In this particular case, the trial judge
concentrated on the lack of violent coercion during the operation, but did not
consider the effect of the financial and social inducements on Hart.
These inducements were significant by anyone’s view, but must be viewed as more
seriously infringing Hart’s autonomy interests, given his extreme poverty and
social isolation as well as his lack of education. The deceit employed
was extensive. By preying on his vulnerabilities to such a degree, the
police deprived Hart of meaningful choice about whether to give an
incriminating statement to Mr. Big—the undercover officer.
The reliability inquiry focuses
on the trustworthiness of any statement obtained. The courts must execute
a gatekeeper function in assessing the risk of a false confession and
corroborating evidence will usually be a prerequisite to admission. This
function is important because juries often struggle to properly assess the
ultimate reliability of Mr. Big confessions. They find it difficult
to believe that someone would confess to a crime that he or she did not commit
and are loath to disregard a confession even where it is known to be
coerced.
This danger is compounded by
the criminal propensity evidence generated during a Mr. Big
investigation. An accused must either let the confession stand or explain
that he or she made it to continue their new criminal lifestyle. The
accused is in situations like this caught between the rhetorical rock and hard
place.
For this reason, confessions
made to Mr. Big are particularly hazardous and judges must evaluate their
threshold reliability to satisfy the important principle against
self-incrimination. Generally, an uncorroborated, unverified confession should
not be considered reliable at all and should be inadmissible. The
principle against self-incrimination is not solely concerned with ensuring
reliable statements; even true statements which may be excluded if they were
obtained through coercion that overrode the suspect’s autonomy interest. This
would also apply if the suspect was offered a deal by the police since deals
should only be made by the prosecutor who is in a better position to know the
legal ramifications of the deal. The reason for this is that it is the role of
the police to catch criminals and obtain information if possible from the
accused but it is the role of the prosecutor to decide if the information
gathered by the police is sufficient to bring the accused to trial or not.
As I said earlier in this
piece, the Supreme Court did not ban Mr. Big operations but instead it introduced
tough new standards for trial judges to consider when dealing with confessions
obtained through Mr. Big operations.
This was Canada’s first case
heard by the Supreme Court that dealt with the potential wrongful convictions brought
about by Mr. Big confessions that clearly recognized the risks that are
inherent in Mr. Big operation’s confessions and how such procedures have the
potential for police misconduct.
The police will now have to
tread very carefully while they are putting their Mr. Big schemes into
operation for the sole purpose of getting their suspects to confess to the
crimes they have been accused of.
Just recently, the judge in an
Oshawa, Ontario acquitted a man accused of murdering his former next door
neighbour after the judge declared that his Mr. Big confession violated the
accused’s Charter rights and constituted an abuse of process.
In the past, some Mr. Big
confessions let the police to bodies and in other cases, confessions contained
statements they knew to be false.
The Supreme Court didn’t
totally exonerate Hart from the charge of murdering his daughters. The court
ordered that if he is brought to trial again in a different court than his
original one, his two confessions obtained by the police in their Mr. Big
operation cannot be used by the prosecution against him but the one he gave
prior to before the Mr. Big operation was underway can be used.
I am not going to presume
whether or not he will be convicted at a new trial but I would be remiss if I
didn’t mention that in my opinion, if he goes to trial, he will have a hard
time explaining why he told the police that he didn’t jump into the water
because he couldn't swim and then instead of using his cell phone to call for
help, he left his other daughter behind
as he drove 11 kilometers to get to his home to bring his wife to the
lake even though he knew that she too couldn’t swim. Unless he has an IQ of
that of a gnat, he would have had to know that by the time he returned to the
lake, the two daughters in the lake would be dead. What makes his defence even
worse is that while he was driving home, he drove past a hospital. If I were the prosecutor, I would not refuse
to retry him for the crimes he allegedly committed against his two young
daughters. Currently, he is still in the penitentiary serving a life sentence.
In the Kyle Unger case, the
police really abused their suspect’s constitutional rights. He was accused of
killing a 16-year-old girl he met at a rock concert in Manitoba in 1990.
Undercover police officer posing as gang members gained his confidence and they
told him that he could be a member of their gang if he could prove that he
committed a serious crime. He confessed to killing the 16-year-old girl. In his
confession, he got certain important facts wrong. For example, the bridge he
spoke of hadn’t even been built. Nevertheless, he was convicted and spent 14
years in prison. He was finally exonerated when a hair found on the body of the
victim wasn’t his hair but that of another person.
He sued the RCMP and both
provincial and federal officials in 2011 for $14.5 million for wrongful
conviction
Clayton Mentuc was suspected of killing a 14-year-old
girl at a fair in Manitoba. The police used the Mr. Big scheme in 1996 to get
him to confess to the crime. They paid him $1,800 for jobs and impressed him
with expensive cars. He denied killing the girl but when they gave him more
money and more work, he confessed to killing the girl, he confessed to killing
the girl. The trial judge rejected the confession as evidence by saying that
the pressure placed against the police to make him confess to the crime was far
too overwhelming to be appropriate as evidence against him. If that is all they
had against him, then he would be acquitted.
Jason Dix was accused in 1996
of killing two men by shooting them three times in the head while they worked
at a packaging plant in Edmonton. The police attempted to get Dix to confess to
the crime by staging an elaborate undercover operation. They flew him to
Toronto to meet a fake mobster and help him count $1-million in cash. The
undercover police also staged a fake murder in British Columbia in his presence
so that he would believe that they were really mobsters. They gave him jobs to do and paid him
thousands of dollars in their attempt to get him to confess to the murders but
he kept denying that he had anything to do with the murders of the two men. The
first degree murder charges against him were dismissed in 1998 and in 2002, he
was awarded $765,000 in damages for the 22 months he was in custody.
Sabastian Burns and Atif Rafay
were accused of murdering Rafay’s parents and his autistic sister by
bludgeoning them to death in their U.S. home. They then fled to Vancouver,
British Columbia. The RCMP was asked for help in getting confessions from the
suspects. They pulled off that old
standby, the Mr. Big scheme. Burns who was then 19- years of age was tricked
into being part of the illusionary criminal underworld. He took part in minor
crimes and was paid for his work. The
RCMP finally extracted a confession from both suspects. They were then
extradited to Seattle. They were tried for the murders and convicted on the
basis of their confessions.
They appealed their convictions
on the grounds that the manner of their confessions obtained was illegal in the
U.S. Their appeals failed because the videotape of their confessions showed
that they were laughing while describing the murders. They are serving life
sentences for their crime.
I hope that you have enjoyed
reading this article as much as I enjoyed writing it.
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