Is a serial rapist entitled to privacy re his
crimes?
In this article, you will get an idea of what goes
on in a prison.
Please note that when I refer to Mr. Subbiah making
arguments in his hearing, it is really his lawyer that made the arguments at the
hearing.
Selva
Kumar Subbiah who is also known as Richard Subbiah was a prison inmate
at the Kingston Penitentiary in Ontario. When the penitentiary closed down, he
was transferred to another penitentiary. He has been an inmate for some
20 years and will not be released until the completion of his full sentence (24
years, 9 months, 1 day) on January 29, 2017. Upon his release he is to be
deported to Malaysia where he was born.
Subbiah
was convicted on two separate occasions for multiple counts of sexual assaults
and other violent offences. His offences include those in which Subbiah would
encounter women, drug them with what is colloquially known as a “date rape”
drug, and then sexually assault them.
He was charged in 1990 and later he pleaded guilty to over seventy
offences including twenty-six counts of sexual assaults and twenty-seven counts
of administering a noxious substance he gave to over thirty victims. There were
a substantial number of other charges which were either not proceeded with or
dropped as a result of his guilty plea. The initial charges for which he
was convicted arose in 1992. When the police were able to make further
investigations, Subbiah was charged with an additional series of sexual
assaults and those charges were dealt with earlier in 1997. Again, Subbiah
pleaded guilty to a number of those offences. He would promise the women
employment in modeling and soon after, secretly drug them so that he could rape
them. He was even violent with his wife by beating her, throwing her down the
stairs, and discharging a starter pistol against her back causing painful
burns. He even threatened her of being mauled by wild animals. This human monster was deserving of punishment
and during the sentencing, the trial judge said in part; “Your behaviour was so
disgusting and so vile that no punishment ascribed by this court would do
justice to your victims.”
The aggregate sentence that he received was in excess of 24 years.
He has served most of his entire sentence at the Kingston Penitentiary. At the
time of this writing, he is now an inmate at Bath Institution that is a very
maximum security prison in Ontario.
In
that prison there were various units where inmates were housed that are called ranges. A number of those ranges were
reserved for high profile offenders who may be subjected to physical abuse by
other inmates. While Subbiah had been in and out of segregation ranges
during the course of his time at Kingston Penitentiary, he had spent a large
amount of time in the general population of the prison. That was most unusual
since convicted sex offenders are generally attacked and sometimes murdered by
other inmates while in the ranges of the general prison population. I am surprised that the prison authorities
permitted him to be in that part of the prison amongst the general prison
population.
In
2008, the National Parole Board, as it was then called and now called the
Parole Board of Canada (“PBC”), was required to hold a hearing regarding parole
for Subbiah. In Canada, a prisoner can apply for parole after serving a
third of his sentence and generally will be released after serving two-thirds
of his sentence unless he is still considered a danger to society.
Subbiah
waived his right to attend the parole hearing. Thus, Subbiah’s parole
consideration proceeded by way of a “paper hearing”. In a decision dated
December 9, 2008, the PBC determined that Subbiah was not a candidate for
statutory parole and would have to serve the remaining part of his sentence in
prison. The decision which was in writing described Subbiah’s criminal
history and many details of his sexual offences. The decision also
included details from psychological reports. Those reports indicated
Mr. Subbiah’s denial and minimization of his offending activities, his
lack of victim empathy, and his substantial degree of indifference towards the
consequences of his offending behaviour. The parole decision concluded
that Subbiah was at a high risk of sexual and violent recidivism.
Soon
after the parole decision was issued, in February 2009, a crime reporter at the
Kingston Whig-Standard, Mr. Robert
Tripp, made an application to the PBC for release of the parole decision
regarding Subbiah pursuant to section 144 of
the Corrections and Release Act (CCRA)
that allows for a “person who can demonstrate
a legitimate interest in a case” to request disclosure of individual parole
decisions. Such persons include members of the media. The PBC excised some
portions of the Decision and forwarded a copy to Mr. Tripp on February 12,
2009. In turn, Mr. Tripp published the Decision on an internet site
called CanCrime.com which is a blog
that deals with crimes and prisons. Subbiah only learned that the Decision was
published online when he was notified by his wife.
Then
on May 14, 2009, Subbiah was attacked by two inmates who managed to block open
a door so that it could not be locked. These inmates, a McPhail and
Martin, stabbed Subbiah six times. Correctional Officers responded to the
assault within one minute. Subbiah sustained six superficial stab wounds during
the attack, along with cuts, scrapes and bruises to his head, neck and body.
He was initially treated at Kingston Penitentiary, then transferred to
Kingston General Hospital, but was released back to the penitentiary the same
day.
Subbiah then brought an
action in a Superior Court for breach of privacy and negligence against both
the Crown (federal government) and more specifically, the PBC and Correctional
Services Canada (CSC) (collectively “the Crown”). As against the PBC, he
alleges that they wrongfully released the Decision of his parole application to
Mr. Tripp who posted it on the internet. Subbiah claims that this was a
breach of his privacy which did not accord with section
144(2)(a) of the CCRA, which provides that information in parole decisions will
not be disclosed where it “could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the
safety of any person”. Subbiah alleged that the PBC’s release of the
Decision led to other inmates at Kingston Penitentiary obtaining information
about his criminal history, which in turn prompted the attack against him on
May 14, 2009. He maintained that this chain of events constituted a
causal connection between the PBC’s release of the Decision and the eventual
attack and injury that he suffered.
Internet use by prisoners in prisons allows inmates to
communicate with the outside. Much like the use of telephones in prisons; the use
of the internet under supervision,
for various purposes, is approved in 49 U.S. correctional systems and five
Canadian provinces including Ontario where Subbiah was imprisoned. I don’t think
inmates accessing another inmate’s parole decision is permitted but the guards
don’t watch prison inmates using the Internet every minute.
In his claim against CSC, Subbiah alleged that they were negligent by
not taking steps to protect him from the planned attack at Kingston
Penitentiary. In addition to the internet publication of the Decision,
Subbiah alleged that the May 14, 2009 attack should have been anticipated
because he was at high risk among the inmate population.
I don’t know whose decision it was to put this man into the general
prison population in the first place but if he had any sense at all, he could
have demanded that Sabbiah be returned to protective custody. He should have
been aware of the risks Sabbiah was facing as a convicted sex offender while
mingling with the general prison population.
Specifically, he alleged that another inmate, Mark Curry, wanted revenge
against him because Subbiah had previously reported a rumoured affair between
Mr. Curry and a female Correctional Officer. He also alleges that CSC was
aware that the Parole Decision was circulating among the inmate population, thereby
placing him at a heightened risk. If that is so, the prison authorities should have taken him out of the
general prison population and put him in protective custody.
Subbiah claimed damages in the amount of $15,000.00 for general damages;
punitive damages of $35,000.00; and a finding that his Charter rights
had been violated.
During the course of the trial eight witnesses were called.
Subbiah gave evidence on his own behalf as did Michael Peteigney, a fellow
inmate from Kingston Penitentiary. On behalf of the Crown, the witnesses were
Nikki Smith, Jan Looman, Greg Van Rossem, Tim O’Hara, Miguel (Mike)
Costa, and Lisa Blasko.
Evidence of Richard Subbiah
During the course of his time in Kingston Penitentiary, Subbiah worked
as a dome cleaner. The dome, or rotunda, is the central part of Kingston
Penitentiary, and the various ranges extend like spokes of a wheel from the
central dome. Subbiah worked afternoons and evenings in the dome,
clearing garbage, washing the floors and stripping and cleaning the floors from
time to time. He would be under watch of the Dome officers at all times so he
certainaly was in no danger from inmates while working there. During this
particular time, he was also sleeping in the protective custody range.
Many years ago, there was an inmate in an Ontario provincial maximum
security prison who was convicted of raping his four-year-old daughter. His sentence
was two years less one day but doubled so he would be spending four years less
two days in that prison. He was given the job of cleaning the chapel in the prison
and remained in the chapel all day and in the evenings (generally alone) until
he was returned to his cell to sleep. They didn’t even put him in the
range where the homosexuals were kept. That
certainly is what one would refer to as protective custody.
On May 14, 2009, Subbiah was assaulted by two inmates, McPhail and
Martin. He said he knew one of them a bit but did not know the other man.
Both of these inmates were housed in the Upper B range, a protected custody
range for inmates who do not want to be a part of the general prison
population.
I am glad that the prison authorities had eventually taken my suggestion
seriously about where the protective custody range was to be. Back in the late
1960s, I was invited to go to the Kingston Penitentiary and make suggestions on
any changes I might recommend. I noticed that the protective custody range was
right next to the Dome and was always unlocked because a guard was standing
next to the entrance. I recommended that it be locked. My suggestion wasn’t
followed and in 1971, the prisoners rioted and those in the unlocked protective
custody range were grabbed by the inmates and tortured with knives. One of
those prisoners died from his wounds.
Subbiah said that it was not his duty to work in the Upper B range, but
a Correctional Officer asked him to take some cleaning supplies to that
range. When he did, Martin, who had just entered the dome area from the
Upper “B” range, blocked the door so that it remained open and the Correctional
Officer in the dome, a Ms. Alexandra McCormick, could not lock it. This
afforded an opportunity for Mr. McPhail and Mr. Martin to attack Mr. Subbiah.
As
said earlier in this piece, Subbiah received six superficial cuts and a number
of bruises in the course of the assault. He was taken to Kingston General
Hospital for review where CAT scans and other tests were performed. He
did not require stitches for any of his wounds. He was released from
Kingston General Hospital within a few hours and returned to the Kingston
Penitentiary Health Centre for a further 24 hours. He received Tylenol 2
and 3 for pain relief and eye drops. He was told to eat soft food for a
couple of days.
When he returned to his cell on May 15th, 2009, Subbiah was segregated
in his unit. He was locked in his cell and did not have access to the
general prison population, nor they to him. He said he was terrified even
though he was out of reach of the other inmates.
Subbiah alleged that there was a connection between the online
publication of the Parole Decision by Mr. Tripp, the reporter from the Kingston Whig-Standard and Mr. Trip’s website
entitled CanCrime.com and the assault
which he suffered on May 14, 2009.
Subbiah said that he never saw the Internet site because inmates at
Kingston Penitentiary do not have access to the internet. I find that
strange because prisoners do have access to the internet but perhaps not those
in the Kingston Penitentiary.
He said he was told about the Internet posting by his wife, and she read
some of it to him. He stated that his wife suffered repercussions at her
work as a result of the Decision being posted online.
Subbiah conceded that, unlike the Internet, newspapers are accessible by
inmates at Kingston Penitentiary. He was also aware that a television
program about him and his crimes was accessible to inmates at Kingston
Penitentiary. He conceded that an inmate’s criminal background was not
necessarily a secret within Kingston Penitentiary.
Subbiah did not see the Internet version of the Decision denying his
parole. However, after hearing about the online publication of the
Decision from his wife, he said he wrote a letter to Greg Van Rossem, his
parole officer, which was copied to various other individuals including Mike
Costa, a Security Investigation Officer (SIO) at Kingston Penitentiary.
The letter, dated March 6, 2009, expressed Mr. Subbiah’s concern that his
parole information was provided to Mr. Tripp. Subbiah asked CSC to
undertake an internal investigation to determine how this information was
released. Nowhere in the letter did Mr. Subbiah indicate that other
inmates might be in possession of a copy of his parole decision. That is
probably because he didn’t know if it was. On cross-examination Subbiah claimed that he
was unaware that his Decision was circulating amongst the inmate population at
the time he wrote the letter to his parole officer. Keep in mind that the
inmates may have read about it by reading the newspaper.
Subbiah gave evidence at length about having had meetings with both Mr.
Van Rossem and Mr. Costa regarding the release of the Decision. He said
that he asked the CSC investigator how it came to be released. He gave
evidence that both Mr. Van Rossem and Mr. Costa admitted that his “privacy had
been maliciously breached” and that there were “foreseeable consequences” for
both Subbiah and his wife.
I agree with those men that Subbiah`s privacy had been breached. It
seems to me that before newspapers are distributed to the inmates in a prison,
sections giving particulars about other inmates in the prison should be
removed.
During the cross-examination relating to both his letter and any
subsequent discussions regarding the Internet posting, Subbiah became evasive
in his answers. Indeed, a number of his answers on cross-examination
varied from the contents in his affidavit. A few examples of this are as
follows:
Subbiah was asked specifically whether he ever told anyone that he
was concerned for his safety. On this issue he was extremely evasive and
only answered, “I was very very concerned”. Moreover, he did not ask to
be segregated from the general prison population prior to the assault. Keep
in mind that he was not attacked while he was in the ranges for the general
population.
In Subbiah’s affidavit, he claimed that on March 12, 2009, other inmates
made derogatory and threatening comments to him as a result of the circulation
of the Decision. He also claimed that, on previous occasions when his
crimes had been publicized in the media, the CSC promised that it would protect
his security. Therefore, he expected that the CSC should have segregated
him from the general prison population when details of the March 12, 2009
threats came to light.
However, on cross-examination, Subbiah was asked if he notified CSC
about the threats he received on March 12, 2009. He maintained that he
told his parole officer, Mr. Van Rossem, stating, “I would definitely have had
this conversation with my parole officer, absolutely”. However, he also
admitted that when his crimes had been publicized in the past, the CSC had
never removed him from the general prison population, or from his dome cleaner
position. The only times he was “locked up” or segregated came when he
specifically requested as much. Yet, he acknowledged that he did not
request being segregated from the general population after receiving threats in
March 2009, or after he received information that Mr. Curry was upset with him
in April 2009.
Subbiah also claimed that there was a breach in security directly prior
to the assault. He said that Correctional Officer McCormick was on duty,
observing the Upper “B” range entrance, but somehow the door to that range was
unlocked and propped open by one of his assailants. To him, this suggested
a breach of security protocol, since barrier doors are to remain locked unless
overseen by a Correctional Officer who is able to maintain static
security.
In his affidavit, he also stated that Officer McCormick banged on the
glass of the observation bubble to encourage Mr. Martin to remain in his range,
and that she was unable to engage the lock after Mr. Martin propped the range
barrier door open. During the course of his cross-examination, Subbiah admitted
that he did not have personal knowledge of how Officer McCormick behaved that
day, or how exactly, the door to the Upper “B” range was unlocked and propped
open. In fact, he acknowledged that much of his recollection of what
transpired with regards to Officer McCormick that day is his recitation of what
was in her observational report, and the subsequent investigative report
disclosed in this lawsuit, as opposed to any direct recollections.
Following the attack, Subbiah complained that he suffered from anxiety,
mental anguish and stress, and that he no longer felt safe in a group of
inmates. He also said that he had developed nightmares. When asked
whether he had reported this to anybody, he said he had reported it to a Mr.
Eastabrook, a psychology nurse at Kingston Penitentiary. He was given
medications, and he assumed he had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
He testified that he saw counsellors frequently and believed that the
medications he was taking were for a diagnosed psychological disorder.
There is no medical evidence in this case regarding his state of mind following
the assault.
In another part of his examination, Subbiah conceded that after
returning to Kingston Penitentiary and being moved to the Lower “G” range, he
sought to become the range representative. When asked why he would do so
in light of his anxiety and fear of groups, he indicated that these were groups
of inmates whom he knew and therefore felt comfortable with. He indicated
that he never took recreation time while he was in the Lower “G” range.
In another exchange, when asked about being a part of a group program for
sexual disorders at the Regional Treatment Centre (RTC), he said that this
group was comfortable with him because all of the other six or seven inmates
who were participating had similar criminal backgrounds and were dealing with
similar issues.
When asked whether or not he was aware that inmates in the institution
would share information about other inmates, Subbiah admitted that there were a
lot of rumours going around.
On the basis of all of his evidence, the judge hearing his case felt that
such knowledge would be shared and exchanged among inmates as to the crimes for
which they were incarcerated, especially for an inmate like Subbiah who had
been in the institution for approximately 15 years at the time of the
assault. He also found that Subbiah was evasive with respect to his
testimony and the judge believed that at times, Subbiah had endeavoured to
overstate his case. Where his evidence conflicted with evidence of other
witnesses of the Crown, the judge preferred the evidence of the other
witnesses.
Was CSC negligent in failing to protect Subbiah from attack?
Subbiah argued that CSC was negligent because CSC staff failed to take
reasonable care to protect his safety when they knew or ought to have known his
safety was in jeopardy. His position was that there is a duty on
prison officials to ensure the safety of inmates.
There is no absolute liability on prison authorities to prevent all harm
to inmates since liability generally follows only where correctional
authorities have actual knowledge of potential harm. In other words, harm
must be reasonably foreseeable. Since he had mingled with inmates in
various ranges previously to the attack and not harmed, harm to him was not
easily foreseeable.
The penitentiary would breach its duty of care to an inmate if it failed
to take reasonable steps in both static and dynamic security once
“pre-indicators of violence” against the inmate where known. Thus, CSC
can be held liable where there is a failure to provide reasonable protection
against the actions of other prisoners where CSC has notice of a risk to an
inmate’s safety. For this reason, the key issues in the hearing were
whether there were pre-indicators of violence, whether CSC knew or ought to
have known that Subbiah was in danger, and whether reasonable steps were taken
to ensure his safety.
Subbiah alleged that CSC had knowledge of pre-indicators of violence in
his case, yet failed to provide adequate security in light of the risks.
The Parole Decision information had been seen by inmates in Kingston
Penitentiary, and Subbiah had alerted a prison official, Mr. Van Rossem of this
fact in March 2009, about two months prior to the attack. While Subbiah did
not specifically request protection, the CSC staff either knew or ought to have
known that the distribution of the Decision detailing Mr. Subbiah’s
offences would put him at risk. That in my opinion is a valid point. Even if he
didn`t ask for protection and even if he didn’t want protection from the other
inmates, he should have been removed from the other inmates for his own safety.
It was argued that the fact that information about the circulation of
his Parole Decision was not passed on to the prison authorities indicates a
breach in the necessary security. As corroboration for Mr. Subbiah’s
safety concerns, CSC staff also knew that Subbiah had requested protective
segregation on multiple occasions, asked to meet with Mr. Curry, and inquired
about a range change. In the face of this knowledge, it is alleged that
CSC allowed Subbiah to enter a transition range, Upper “B”, and come into
contact with other inmates who were intended to be segregated. Section 70
of the CCRA requires that all reasonable steps are taken to ensure that
the penitentiary and its environment are safe for inmates and staff, regardless
of whether an inmate complains about a risk. The fact that the
information in the Parole Decision was previously available public information
does not relieve CSC of the duty to ensure security. I have to agree with that
position of Subbiah.
Subbiah also maintained that
CSC’s static security was inadequate, as evidenced by the unlocked barrier door
to the Upper “B” range. It was unlocked despite the fact that
Correctional Officers knew that Subbiah was attending near the Upper “B” range
to deliver supplies, and the area outside the Upper “B” range is a restricted
space. Either the barrier door to Upper “B” should not have been
released, or, Correctional Officers should have prevented Subbiah from
entering the dome. Subbiah alleges either an Officer negligently released
the barrier door to the Upper “B” range; an Officer negligently allowed Subbiah
to enter the dome with knowledge that inmates from the Upper “B” range had
breached the area; or, an officer was negligent in allowing Subbiah into the
dome prior to surveying the area to ensure its safety. Officer McCormick
is said to be negligent opening the barrier door. Those are reasonable
suggestions, in my opinion.
Subbiah also argued that no Correctional Officers present at the time of
the assault, including Officer McCormick, testified at the hearing, so a
negative inference should be drawn against CSC. Not a good argument because his
lawyer could have subpoenaed them to testify at the hearing.
The Crown maintained that the evidence suggested that CSC was unaware of
any risk to Subbiah prior to the assault and therefore the assault was not
foreseeable. Thus, CSC’s actions were reasonable prior to the assault. The
Crown conceded that CSC has a duty of care, but argued that the CSC met its
standard of care to Mr. Subbiah, and thusly his claim of negligence must
fail.
The Crown argued that the legal question is whether, in the
circumstances and on a balance of probabilities, the harm to Subbiah was
reasonably foreseeable so that the CSC knew or ought to have known of the risk
of danger. The Crown maintained that the May 14, 2009 attack was not
foreseeable, and therefore there is no breach of the standard of care for a
“quick, planned and violent attack. A prison is an inherently dangerous
environment, and the CSC cannot guarantee each inmate’s safety, or protect
inmates from unpredictable dangers.
I agree that prisons are inherently dangerous but the prison staff
should guarantee the safety of prisoners, such as child molesters, rapists and
snitches who are susceptible to assaults.
In the prison context, pre-indicators of violence will satisfy the
requirement of reasonable foreseeability, but in this case the Crown maintained
that there were no such pre-indicators. For example, security
intelligence at Kingston Penitentiary had no information that Subbiah’s parole
decision was being distributed amongst inmates, and even if they did it would
not have caused concern because the information in the Parole Decision was
publicly available in the prison.
That argument is ridiculous. Surely the prison staff had to know that if
the inmates read the newspaper and specifically about the parole Decision, they
should have realized that since Subbiah was in their prison, his safety would
be at risk. That is when they should have put him in protective custody,
whether or not he was agreeable to that change in the ranges.
The Crown noted that an inmate, particularly one as well-versed with the
prison environment and culture as Subbiah, would be expected to warn the CSC staff
if there was a risk of danger. In the past, when Subbiah felt his safety
was at risk, he made a protective custody request. He made such a request
in March 2008, and security intelligence took the requisite steps to ensure his
safety. Yet, Subbiah made no such request after learning that the Parole Decision
was posted online. Indeed, Ms. Blasko, Mr. Costa, and Mr. Van Rossem all
confirmed that Subbiah never advised them that he was at risk or in danger, or
that he had reason to believe that the Parole Decision was circulating among
inmates. Moreover, Subbiah never indicated that he felt at risk due to Mr. Curry,
and the CSC had no other information to suggest that this might be the case. If
that is true, then what followed was Subbiah’s fault.
The Crown argued that the CSC took reasonable steps, in both static and
dynamic security, to prevent an assault against Subbiah. It also strongly argued,
that the CSC’s security measures need not be perfect or infallible.
Rather, they must be adequate and reasonable, taking the entire context of the
event into account. I agree with that argument.
Considering the entire context of the attack on Subbiah, the Crown argued
that the CSC’s measures were adequate and reasonable. There was nothing
to suggest that an Upper “B” inmate presented a risk to Subbiah.
Once the “quick, planned and violent” attack occurred, CSC Officers responded
in less than one minute. Officer McCormick had a duty to remain at her
post and face the Upper “B” range; she did so, and radioed for assistance
immediately upon seeing the assault. There was no evidence that the Upper
“B” range door malfunctioned. Overall, there is no failure by the CSC to
provide reasonable static and dynamic security. Thus, CSC did not breach
the standard of care.
Even if CSC breached the standard of care owed to Subbiah, the Crown
insisted that there was no causal link between the breach and his injuries,
because Subbiah suffered no more than minor and superficial cuts and
bruises. If he did suffer a greater injury, it is not causally linked to
any breach by the CSC. There is no evidence that the Decision was
circulating amongst other inmates prior to the assault, let alone that its
distribution two months earlier precipitated the assault. Therefore,
there was no causal link between the distribution of the Decision and the
attack and there is no causal link between any alleged breach in static or
dynamic security and the assault. The evidence suggests that the assault
was caused either by Subbiah’s problems with Mr. Curry, or his selling of
cleaning supplies to inmates which he was not permitted to do.
Finally, while Subbiah argued that an adverse inference should be drawn
against the Crown because Correctional Officer McCormick was not called as a
witness, the Crown submits that such an adverse inference can only be drawn
where the plaintiff has established a prima facie (apparent) case,
and Subbiah had failed to do so. Regardless, the Crown called six
witnesses, including Ms. Blasko who had received a copy of Ms. McCormick’s
observation report from the time of the assault. Ms. Blasko considered
this report to be truthful, and she made use of it when supervising the
drafting of the investigation report about the assault. Therefore, any
evidence that Ms. McCormick could have advanced was provided by Ms.
Blasko. In addition, nothing prevented Subbiah from calling Ms. McCormick
as a witness.
Judge’s Decision in his words
With respect to the claim of negligence against CSC, I find that there
was no negligence. Both parties accept that CSC owed Subbiah a duty of
care. Both also agree that if pre-indicators of violence existed, or if
violence against Subbiah was otherwise predictable, then CSC was obliged to
take reasonable steps to ensure his safety.
The evidence of the various CSC officers all indicates that assaults are
fairly frequent at Kingston Penitentiary and that it is a “dangerous place”.
However, there was no indication that an assault on Subbiah was pending and
there was no security intelligence information to that effect.
Significantly, Subbiah did not make it known to anyone that he might be the
subject of an attack. It does appear he may have had some information
about another inmate, Mr. Curry, being upset with him. However, he did
not report it but simply sought to meet with Mr. Curry. Several of the
reports indicate that Subbiah had a private conversation with Mr. Curry
prior to the assault.
As well, Subbiah made no comment to the security intelligence people that
he felt his safety was imperilled. The evidence shows that inmates in the
Upper “B” range are considered to be at risk from the general inmate
population, of which Subbiah was part. There is no evidence that Subbiah had
a pre-existing antagonism with either of his assailants, so it appears that
“inmate incompatibility”, a common predictor of risk or violence, was not an
issue Absent convincing evidence of a foreseeable risk to Subbiah, or any
pre-indicators of violence, the CSC could not have anticipated that inmates
from the Upper “B” range posed a threat to him.
To be foreseeable, there must be a reasonable prospect that the event
will occur. In Bastarache v Canada, 2003, Madam Justice
Leyden-Stevenson described the duty owed to inmates by prison authorities as
follows:
“The prison
authorities owe a duty to take reasonable care for the health and safety of the
inmate while in custody. In addressing the duty of care, regard must be had to
the circumstances surrounding the incident. An important consideration in
the foreseeability of risk is the likelihood of the occurrence of the event
giving rise to the risk. The issue is not whether there is a duty of care, but
whether the acts or omissions of the defendant fall below the standard of
conduct of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the circumstances.” unquote
The judge asked himself, “Was the attack on Subbiah foreseeable in all
of the circumstances? In my view it was not, for a number of reasons. First,
significantly, an investigation following the assault indicated that Subbiah was
targeted because he was selling cleaning supplies to inmates. Even after
the event, Subbiah did not tell anyone that he blamed the release of the Parole
Decision for his assault.
Second, at the time of the assault, Subbiah was carrying out his duties
as a dome cleaner and taking supplies to the Upper “B” range. At the same
time, Mr. Martin was carrying out his duties as a cleaner on the Upper “B”
range. The officer observing the situation acted with dispatch as soon as
she detected that Mr. Martin had blocked open a door which could not be
relocked. Within a minute Correctional Officers responded and took control
of the situation. Given the dangerous environment in which these inmates
live, this response to a quick, violent, unanticipated assault was entirely
appropriate.
Third, I accept officer Blasko’s evidence that there were no
pre-indicators of violence and that the officer in charge acted
appropriately. Therefore, I find that security measures were adequate and
reasonable in the circumstances. On these facts, CSC met the standard of care
owed to Mr.Subbiah.
Was the PBC’s disclosure of Subbiah’s Decision negligent?
Plaintiff’s (Subbiah) Submissions
According to Mr. Subbiah, the decision of the Parole Board of
Canada (PBC) to disclose the Decision to Mr. Tripp constitutes negligence
because: 1) the PBC owed a duty of care to Mr. Subbiah; (2) the PBC failed
to meet the requisite standard of care; and (3) the PBC’s failure to meet the
requisite standard of care caused injury to Mr. Subbiah. Specifically, he
contends that the PBC’s release of the Decision contributed to his
vulnerability to attack, and so the PBC is contributory negligent.
Further, Subbiah submitted that the PBC owed a duty of care because
there is a relationship of proximity between him and the PBC.
Subbiah also argued that the harm Subbiah suffered as a result of the
PBC’s disclosure was a foreseeable consequence, since all parties acknowledge
that sexual offenders are at greater risk within Canada’s penal system.
Further, subsection
144(2)(a) of the CCRA
compels the PBC to withhold information that
could jeopardize any person’s safety. Mr. Tripp was a member of the media,
the PBC ought to have foreseen that the Parole Decision would be published.
The PBC also should have known that published material, whatever the
medium, can be obtained by inmate populations. Thus, the harm to Subbiah occasioned
by the PBC’s disclosure of the Parole Decision was foreseeable. Whatever
review of the circumstances that the PBC undertook was inadequate. As I
mentioned earlier, the section in the paper that described the Parole Decision
with reference to Subbiah should have been cut out of the paper.
The next problem concerns the proximity between the PBC and Subbiah
who submitted that his circumstances are analogous
to other established categories of proximity where a government department, in
this case the PBC, is entrusted with duties unique to the government.
Proximity in tort law includes those persons who could suffer harm by the acts
of another if that harm was reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, while section 8 of
the Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c
P-21, may allow for the
disclosure of personal information, such disclosure is subject to any other Act
of Parliament, and the CCRA establishes that the PBC has a legislated duty to withhold
information that could pose a risk of harm to anyone, including Subbiah.
Accordingly, he submitted that a prima facie duty of care has
been established, so the onus shifted to the PBC to negate that duty.
Regarding a breach in the standard of care and causation, Subbiah relied
on Mr. Peteigney’s evidence. If Mr. Peteigney’s evidence is accepted,
then it is established that the Parole Decision was circulating in Kingston
Penitentiary prior to his assault on May 14, 2009, and that inmates were
placing bets on when Subbiah would be attacked. This was a breach of
the prison’s dynamic security, and it was caused by the PBC’s failure to alert
CSC that the parole decision was being released to a media member.
While PBC claims that it has no obligation to alert CSC when a parole
decision is released, Subbiah argued that the PBC’s present practice
contravened s 144(2)(a) of the CCRA in the specific context of this case,
and so liability must be found. Subbiah noted that a finding of such
liability will not open any “floodgates”, because such a precedent will only
apply where the PBC fails to comply with the CCRA.
Crown’s Submissions
The Crown submitted that Subbiah had failed to prove his allegations of
negligence by the PBC. Subbiah had failed to establish that a duty of care
exists between him and the PBC. There is no proximate relationship
between them, since the duty of care proposed by Subbiah would be incompatible
with the PBC’s mandate to balance the interests of offenders with various other
social interests.
Further, the Crown argued that there was no evidence of any interaction
between the PBC and Subbiah in relation to the disclosure of the Parole
Decision. Even if there was a proximate relationship, the Crown argued
that there are multiple residual policy reasons exist to negate any prima
facie duty of care. To establish liability against the PBC for
complying with its statutory mandate to release parole decisions to interested
parties would open the floodgates, leaving PBC liable in tort for all of its
decisions.
Even if a duty of care existed, the Crown submitted that there was no
breach of the standard of care because the PBC acted in accordance with
the CCRA
and the Privacy Act. The PBC also acted in good faith, so even if there was an
error in the exercise of its statutory duties, the PBC cannot be said to have
breached the applicable standard of care.
In my opinion, I think the PBC should inform the prison authorities of
their pending public release of their decisions so that the prison staff can
place the inmates in in need of protection in protective custody.
Finally, even if there was a breach of the standard of care, the Crown
submitted that there is no causal link between the release of the parole
decision to Mr. Tripp and the assault. There is no evidence that the parole
decision was circulating in Kingston Penitentiary prior to the assault, and
even if there was, the security situation would be unchanged because the
information in the decision was publicly available. Therefore, a negligence
claim against the PBC must fail.
Judge’s final decision
"At the outset it is helpful to set out a similar decision as refined by
the Supreme Court wherein the Supreme Court observed:
“We suggest that at this stage in the evolution of
the law, both in Canada and abroad, the rule is best understood as
follows. At the first stage of the test, two questions
arise: (1) was the harm that occurred the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s act? and (2) are there reasons, notwithstanding
the proximity between the parties established in the first part of this test,
that tort liability should not be recognized here? The proximity analysis
involved at the first stage of the test focuses on factors arising
from the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
These factors include questions of policy, in the broad sense of that
word. If foreseeability and proximity are established at the first stage,
a prima facie duty of care arises. At the second stage
of the test, the question still remains whether there are residual
policy considerations outside the relationship of the parties that may negative
the imposition of a duty of care. It may be, as the Privy Council (federal
cabinet) suggests that such considerations will not often prevail.
However, we think it useful expressly to ask, before imposing a new duty of
care, whether despite foreseeability and proximity of relationship, there are
other policy reasons why the duty should not be imposed.
Reasonable
foreseeability of the harm must be supplemented by proximity. The
question is what is meant by proximity. Two things may be said. The
first is that “proximity” is generally used in the authorities (previous court
cases) to characterize the type of relationship in which a duty of care may
arise. The second is that sufficiently proximate relationships are
identified through the use of categories. The categories are not closed
and new categories of negligence may be introduced. But generally,
proximity is established by reference to these categories. This provides
certainty to the law of negligence, while still permitting it to evolve to meet
the needs of new circumstances.
Mr. Subbiah relies exclusively on Mr. Peteigney’s evidence to establish
that the Parole Decision was being passed between inmates at Kingston
Penitentiary in the time leading up to the May 14, 2009 attack. Yet, for the
reasons described above, Mr. Peteigney’s evidence is wholly unreliable and must
be completely discounted. Therefore, there is no evidence to support the
allegation that the Parole Decision made its way into the hands of inmates at
Kingston Penitentiary. Accordingly, there is no basis for Mr. Subbiah’s
allegation that the release of the Parole Decision was a proximate cause of his
assault, and therefore no basis for his claim of negligence against the PBC.
Damages
As I have found (a) that there is no causal connection between the
stabbing and the release of the Parole Decision; and, (b) that there is no
negligence on behalf of either the PBC or CSC, Subbiah is not entitled to
damages. The action is dismissed Even if there was some causality or
negligence any damages awarded would be purely nominal. For the reasons given,
the action is dismissed with costs.” unquote
Good luck trying to collect costs from an inmate in prison who is going
to be deported when he is released.
I think there are three lessons to be learned with respect to this case.
They are:
1. Prison inmates who have
been convicted of sexual crimes or are child killers or are known as snitches,
should automatically be placed in protective custody ranges and remain in those
ranges until they are released from prison. No exceptions should be made.
2. Anything in a newspaper or
magazine that includes articles about any inmate currently in a prison should
be cut out of the newspaper and/or magazine before they are distributed to the
inmates.
3. Parole decisions that are publicized
shouldn’t be available to the news media or the Internet until the prison
authorities are notified so that steps can be undertaken to protect the prisoner
who is the subject of the PBC disclosure is placed in protective custody if he
is a child molester or child killer, a rapist or a snitch.
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