CAN A 4 ½ YEAR-OLD CHILD TESTIFY IN COURT? 

                                          

Many years ago, one of my four granddaughters was molested by a friend of mine. She was only five years old at that time. She didn’t have to testify in court because the man pleaded guilty at his trial and he served a year in prison for that crime and wasn’t permitted to attend his father’s funeral while he was serving his time in prison. By the way, the man is no longer a friend of mine.

This article is about a small child who in 1985 was molested at the office of her family’s doctor, (Dr. Abdullah Khan) for a general examination of her mother and a routine immunization of the child. For the purpose of this article, I will refer to the girl as T. She would be a middle-aged woman by the time I published this article in my blog.

Dr. Khan examined T first, in the presence of her mother.  He then told T to wait in his private office while he conducted the examination of her mother.   Dr. Khan and T. were alone in his private office for a period of five to seven minutes while the mother undressed and put on a hospital gown.  T. was later alone in the office for the following fifteen minutes while her mother's examination was being conducted.  T. did not come into contact with any other male person during that period.

 When the mother rejoined T, she noticed the child picking at a wet spot on her sleeve.  They left and went to a nearby drugstore.  Upon leaving the store, approximately fifteen minutes after leaving Dr. Khan's office, mother and child essentially had the following conversation.

Mother:  So you were talking to Dr. Khan, were you?  What did he

say?

Child:  .He asked me if I wanted a candy.  I said yes.  And do you

know what?

Mother: What?

Child: He said "open your mouth".  And do you know what?  He

put his birdie in my mouth, shook it and peed in my mouth. It was

probably semen

Mother: “Are you sure”?

Child:  “Yes.”

Mother:  “You are not lying to me, are you?”

Child:  “He put his birdie in my mouth.  And he never did give me

my candy.” What a double-crossing creep.

The mother testified at the doctor’s trial that the word `birdie' meant penis to T.  As a result of the police investigation T.'s jogging suit was examined and the spot on the sleeve was determined to have been produced by a deposit of semen and, in some areas, a mixture of semen and saliva that had soaked through the fabric before it dried.  The concentration of the mixture suggested to the forensic biologist that the substances were probably mixed before they were applied to the material.

T. was called as a witness at the doctor’s trial.  By then, she was four years and eight months old. Questioning revealed that she did not understand what the Bible was and did not understand the nature of telling the truth in court. 

The Crown (prosecutor) did not presume that she was competent to give evidence under oath.  The prosecutor submitted, however, that her unsworn evidence should be received under section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act:

In any legal proceeding where a child of tender years is presented as a witness, and such child does not, in the opinion of the judge, justice or other presiding officer, understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of such child may be received, though not given upon oath, if, in the opinion of the judge, justice (a more senior judge) or other presiding officer, as the case may be, the child is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify accepting the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth. No case shall be decided upon such evidence alone since it must be corroborated by some other material evidence or an older witness.

The trial judge refused to receive T.'s unsworn evidence on the ground that while she possessed sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence but he was not satisfied that she understood the duty of speaking the truth.

He also rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the statements T. made to her mother were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule because they were "spontaneous statements".  Nevertheless,  the judge did not admit the evidence of the mother with regard to the conversation that took place shortly after leaving the doctor's office.   He concluded:

              “In all of the circumstances, and however suspicious I remain at this moment, the Crown (prosecutor) has fallen just short of proof of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” unquote

When you think about his decision, it was a really stupid decision.  The girl’s saliva mixed with the doctor’s semen is sufficient evidence that that what she testified was what really occurred in the doctor’s office, otherwise, how did that mixture end up on her sleeve?

Suppose the girl had been murdered and another four year and eight month child witnessed the murder and the murdered child’s saliva and his semen was found on his sleeve, would this stupid judge refuse to accept the testimony of the young witness because the Crown had fallen just short of proof of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the judge wouldn’t accept the testimony of the young child who witnessed the murder?  The murderer would walk out of that courtroom as a free man just as Dr. Khan did.

The Crown appealed and the matter was heard by three members of the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1990.

Mr. Justice Robins writing for the other two judges picked from the court found that the trial judge erred when considering the admission of the child's testimony. He found that the trial judge applied the more strenuous test for admission of sworn testimony when he should have applied the less strenuous test applicable to unsworn testimony. Robins also held that the trial judge erred when considering the admissibility of the spontaneous statements. In Robin’s opinion because the child was of tender years and because a sexual abuse was alleged greater latitude should have been given in respect of the lapse of time between the event and the declaration by the girl to her mother.

              To satisfy the less stringent standards applicable to unsworn evidence, the child need only understand the duty to speak the truth in terms of ordinary everyday social conduct.   This can be demonstrated through a simple line of questioning directed to whether the child understands the difference between the truth and a lie, knows that it is wrong to lie, understands the necessity to tell the truth, and promises to do so.   It is to be borne in mind that the child's unsworn evidence must be corroborated by some other material evidence.   Any frailties that may be inherent in the child's testimony go to the weight to be given the testimony rather than its admissibility.

Forty-seven ago when I was a private investigator, I was asked to investigate a case where a thief broke into the upper floor of a restaurant. That floor was the residence of the owner of the restaurant.  The three-year old daughter saw the thief. The police decided not to question the girl because they presumed that she wouldn’t be able to understand the questions the police were going to ask her.  Obviously, they at that time didn’t have any children of their own.  By the time a child is three years old, he or she is quite able by then to express him or herself. I know because when I would tell my two daughters that it was time to go to bed, they were quite articulate in telling me that it wasn’t time to go to bed.

When my five-year-old granddaughter was molested, she was conversant with her mother and the police investigator (a woman) and told them what the man had done to her. As I mentioned in the beginning of this article, she didn’t have to testify in court because the man confessed to the police that he had molested my granddaughter.     

The second error, the Court of Appeal concluded, was to place too much weight on the fact that the child was very young; in effect drawing a distinction between children of very tender years and older children.  It was clear that the trial judge was concerned by the very young age of the witness.  He pointed out that most of the cases concerned children of ten to thirteen years and that he could find no case of the evidence of a child under five being received.  While acknowledging that theoretically a child of any age could be proffered in court, he noted in his concluding comments:

“T however intelligent she may be to this day, is still very much an infant who is just beginning to embark upon childhood.  She is still mentally and physically normal but very immature.” unquote       

Admittedly, all children of that age are very immature, but they can remember things that happened to them. When I was five years of age in 1938, I spent a year in a sanitarium for kids suffering from tuberculosis and I remember even to this day a great deal of my experiences in those buildings and the grounds. Just as all children that age are immature, it doesn`t mean that I didn`t know what was going on during my life in that institution.      

 I agree with Justice Robin`s conclusion when he ruled that the trial judge made the two errors to which it referred.  He erred by concluding that T did not understand what it meant to lie to the court.  While the distinction between the ability to testify under oath and the ability to give unsworn evidence has been narrowed by rejection in cases such as of the need for a religious understanding of the oath, it has not been eliminated. Before a person can give evidence under oath, it must be established that the oath in some way gets a hold on his conscience, that there is an appreciation of the significance of testifying in court under oath.  It was wrong to apply this test, which T. clearly did not meet, to where the only two requirements for reception of the evidence are sufficient—intelligence and an understanding of the duty to tell the truth. If T was severely retarded, that would be different. However I should point out that retarded children who are not severely retarded know the difference between telling the truth and lying. I speak as an authority of this because I was a senior supervisor in a residential school for retarded children for a year in the early 1960s.  I knew when they were telling me the truth and when they were lying to me and they knew that I knew when they were lying to me.  

The trial judge also erred in placing critical weight on the child's young age.  The Evidence Act in the Canadian Criminal Code makes no distinction between children of different ages. The trial judge in effect found that T. met the two requirements for permitting a child to testify under section 16, but, emphasizing her immaturity and for that reason, the judge rejected her evidence. Nevertheless, he found that T. had sufficient intelligence, and conceded that she "seemed to be aware at least of the consequences of telling a lie."  This is clear from T.'s evidence, as revealed by the following portions of the transcript:

Q.  Yes, Do you know what it is to tell the truth?  You're sort of shrugging your shoulders there and smiling.  Do you know what it is to tell a lie?

A.  U-hmm. (Yes)

Q.  What's a lie?

A.  If you say you cleaned up the room and you didn't, and your mother and your father went to see it and it's messy, that's a lie.

Q.  I see.  What happens when you tell a lie?

A.  The parent spank their bum.

Q.  I see.  You're doing just fine.  Tell me, what else happens to you if you tell a lie?

A.  I get spanked and I get sent in my room and I get cleaned up and I cry and I come back out and I not cry, and that's okay.

Q.  And then everything is fine, is it?

A. (Nod) (Yes)

Having found that the two requirements for reception of the evidence under section 16 had been fulfilled, the trial judge erred in letting himself be swayed by the young age of the child.  If that was a determinative consideration, there would be the danger that abusers who committed offences against very young children could never be prosecuted.

Because of the frequent difficulty of obtaining other evidence and because of the lack of reason to doubt many statements children make on sexual abuse to others, courts in the United States have moved toward relaxing the requirements of admissibility for such statements.  This has been done in the context of the doctrine of spontaneous declarations.  In McCormick on Evidence, the authors refer to this development as the "tender years" exception to the general rule, and describe it as follows:

“”A tendency is apparent in cases of sex offences against children of   tender years to be less strict with regard to permissible time lapse and to the fact that the statement was in response to inquiry.”

Fifteen minutes after leaving Dr. Khan's office, in response to her mother's query, T. told her mother about the sexual act the doctor had performed on her.  The issue is whether the mother's statement of what she was told is admissible in evidence.  The trial judge rejected the statement, holding that it was hearsay and did not fall within any of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule, and in particular the spontaneous declaration exception. 

The Court of Appeal in this particular case and others like it held that the statement should have been received on the ground that the inherent reliability of the child's statement was such that the usual requirements for spontaneous declarations of contemporaneity and intensity or pressure should be relaxed.

  

The judge writing the decision for the Appeal Court in this particular case said; “I am satisfied that applying the traditional tests for spontaneous declarations, the trial judge correctly rejected the mother's statement.  The statement was not contemporaneous, being made fifteen minutes after leaving the doctor's office and probably one-half hour after the offence was committed. Nor was it made under pressure or emotional intensity which would give the guarantee of reliability upon which the spontaneous declaration rule has traditionally rested.  The question then is the extent to which, if at all, the strictures of the hearsay rule should be relaxed in the case of children's testimony.  The issue is one of great importance in view of the increasing number of prosecutions for sexual offences against children and the hardships that often attend requiring children to retell and relive the frequently traumatic events surrounding the episode in a long series of encounters with parents, social workers, police and finally different levels of courts.” unquote

 The hearsay rule has traditionally been regarded as an absolute rule, subject to various categories of exceptions, such as admissions, dying declarations, declarations against interest and spontaneous declarations.  While this approach has provided a degree of certainty to the law on hearsay evidence, it has frequently proved unduly inflexible in dealing with new situations and new needs in the law.  This has resulted in courts in recent years on occasion adopting a more flexible approach, rooted in the principle and the policy underlying the hearsay rule rather than the strictures of traditional exceptions.

  This particular Court of Appeal took such an approach in Ares v. Venner, (Supreme Court of Canada ruling) in which the plaintiff was suing for medical malpractice which had resulted in amputation of his leg for gangrene.  He wanted to introduce hospital records containing entries by nurses as evidence of the onset of symptoms which the doctor should have noticed and treated.  He was met with the objection that the records were hearsay and he should call the nurses who made the notations.  But he could not prove which nurse had made which entry, which subsequently made that approach impossible.

That Court (UK Supreme Court) held that the records should be admitted, notwithstanding that on the traditional rules, they were inadmissible.  The Court accepted the proposition that the common law (previous court decisions) is moulded by the judges and it is still their province (authority) to adapt it from time to time so as to make it serve the interests of those it binds", particularly in the field of procedural law: per Lord Donovan, dissenting, in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Justice Hall quoted the following passage from the reasons in Myers of Lord Pearce, dissenting when he said;

              “I find it impossible to accept that there is any "dangerous uncertainty" caused by obvious and sensible improvements in the means by which the court arrives at the truth.  One is entitled to choose between the individual conflicting obiter dicta (remarks  of  a judge  that  are  not necessary  in reaching any decision but are instead made as comments), of two great judges and I prefer that of Jessel M.R.  His dictum was as follows, "Now I take it the principle which underlies all these exceptions is the same.  In the first place, the case must be one in which it is difficult to obtain other evidence, for no doubt the ground for admitting the exceptions was that very difficult.  In the next place the declarant must be disinterested; that is, disinterested in the sense that the declaration was not made in favour of his or her interest.  And, thirdly, the declaration must be made before dispute or litigation, so that it was made without bias on account of the existence of a dispute or litigation which the declarant might be supposed to favour.  Lastly, and this appears to me one of the strongest reasons for admitting it, the declarant must have had peculiar means of knowledge not possessed in ordinary cases."  On that expression of principle he admitted the extension which has been acted on ever since in the Probate Division.” unquote

The UK Supreme Court justice said; “In the result, this Court concluded that the nurses' records should be admitted, noting however that the admission should, in no way, preclude a party wishing to challenge the accuracy of the records or entries from doing so and adding that the nurses were present in court and available to be called as witnesses if the respondent had so wished.” unquote

Justice Robins also said,  “Lord Pearce's four tests may be resumed in two general requirements: necessity and reliability.  The child's statement to the mother in this case meets both these general requirements as well as the more specific tests.  Necessity was present, other evidence of the event, as the trial judge found, being inadmissible.  The situation was one where, to borrow Lord Pearce's phrase, ‘it was difficult to obtain other evidence.’  The evidence also bore strong indications of reliability.  T. was disinterested, in the sense that her declaration was not made in favour of her interest.  She made the declaration before any suggestion of litigation.  And beyond doubt she possessed peculiar means of knowledge of the event of which she told her mother.  Moreover, the evidence of a child of tender years on such matters may bear its own special stamp (proof) of reliability.” unquote

 He also said, “Where the declarant (statement) is a child of tender years and the alleged event involves a sexual offence, special considerations come into play in determining the admissibility of the child's statement.   This is so because young children of the age with which we are concerned here are generally not adept at reasoned reflection or at fabricating tales of sexual perversion.  They manifestly are unlikely to use their reflective powers to concoct a deliberate untruth, and particularly one about a sexual act which in all probability is beyond their understanding. “ unquote

Because of the frequent difficulty of obtaining other evidence and because of the lack of reason to doubt many statements children make on sexual abuse to others, courts in the United States have moved toward relaxing the requirements of admissibility for such statements.  This has been done in the context of the doctrine of spontaneous declarations.  In McCormick on Evidence, the authors refer to this development as the "tender years" exception to the general rule, and describe it as follows:

A tendency is apparent in cases of sex offences against children of tender years to be less strict with regard to permissible time lapse and to the fact that the statement was in response to an inquiry. (asking the child what happened)

 Similarly, Wharton's Criminal Evidence states that while the rule in sex crimes is the same as in other criminal actions, the rule should be applied more liberally in the case of children.  In an attempt to analyze the many authorities in this area and arrive at some general ‘rule of thumb’ with respect to the generally permissible time lapse between the alleged sexual assault and the spontaneous declaration, the author notes that declarations made up to an hour following the assault will generally be admissible, whereas such declarations will not ordinarily be regarded as part of the second-hand statements that are considered trustworthy for the purpose of admission as evidence where the time interval between the crime and the declaration is more than one hour.

These developments underline the need for increased flexibility in the interpretation of the hearsay rule to permit the admission in evidence of statements made by children to others about sexual abuse.  In so far as they are tied to the exception to the hearsay rule of spontaneous declarations, however, they suffer from certain defects.  There is no requirement that resort to the hearsay evidence be necessary.  Even where the evidence of the child might easily be obtained without undue trauma, the Crown (prosecutor) would be able to use hearsay evidence as evidence.  Nor is there any requirement that the reliability of the evidence in the particular case be established; hence inherently unreliable evidence might be admitted.  Finally, the rule being of an absolute "in-or-out" character, there is no means by which a trial judge could attach conditions on the reception of a particular statement which the judge might deem prudent in a particular case, as for example, the right to cross-examine the deponent (person making the statement under oath) referred to in Ares v. Venner.  In addition to these objections, it can be argued that to extend the spontaneous declaration rule as far as these cases would extend it, is to deform it beyond recognition and is conceptually undesirable. 

In Canada too, courts have been moving to more flexibility in the reception of the hearsay evidence of children, although not under the support of the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. The British Columbia Court of Appeal admitted similar evidence. At issue was hearsay evidence in the context of child protection proceedings.  A five-year-old child had been apprehended (seized by the authorities) after allegations of sexual abuse committed by the child’s father.  Counsel sought to introduce evidence of statements made by the child to a psychologist.

The concern with admitting hearsay evidence and acting upon it when dealing with a grave allegation of misconduct on the part of a parent to a child is not to be overlooked.

A judge, conducting an inquiry of this nature that involves a child of tender years who is too young to testify in the inquiry, can receive hearsay evidence and rely upon such evidence in coming to the decision as to whether or not the child is in need of protection.

 Oftentimes in cases of alleged sexual abuse of a young child, the only evidence available is contained in a statement made by the child to some third party.  Usually such statements are not made in circumstances that would meet the criteria for admission under the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule.  If the child cannot or for some valid reason does not testify about the facts asserted in the out-of-court statement and hearsay is excluded. the court will be deprived of hearing what could be the most relevant of evidence.  Faced with that situation, the court may admit the third party's evidence as proof of the facts contained in the child's statement, even though that evidence is hearsay, provided that, as groundwork for its admission, sufficient evidence is first led to establish the reliability of the out-of-court statement, and of the circumstances which establish the need to introduce the content of the child's statement through hearsay.  In such cases, the court must always proceed with great caution both with regard to satisfying itself on the question of the reliability of the child's statements, as well as with respect to those circumstances which justify the need for the admissibility of the out-of-court statements.

The concern with admitting hearsay evidence and acting upon it when dealing with a grave allegation of misconduct on the part of a parent to a child is not to be overlooked. Clearly, no judge would be satisfied to act upon it in a case where direct evidence would be produced.  But that consideration does not resolve the problem.

The first question should be whether reception of the hearsay statement is necessary.  Necessity for these purposes must be interpreted as ‘reasonably necessary’.  The inadmissibility of the child's evidence might be one basis for a finding of necessity.  But sound evidence based on psychological assessments that testimony in court might be traumatic for the child or harm the child might also serve.  There may be other examples of circumstances which could establish the requirement of necessity.

The next question to be answered should be whether the evidence is reliable.  Many considerations such as timing, demeanour, (attitude while giving evidence) the personality of the child, the intelligence and understanding of the child, and the absence of any reason to expect fabrication in the statement may be relevant on the issue of reliability.  I don’t wish to draw up a strict list of considerations for reliability, nor do I wish to suggest that certain categories of evidence (for example the evidence of young children on sexual encounters) should be always regarded as reliable.  The matters relevant to reliability will vary with the child and with the circumstances, and are best left to the trial judge to decide.

In determining the admissibility of the evidence, the judge must have regard to the need to safeguard the interests of the accused.  In most cases a right of cross-examination, such as that alluded to in Ares v. Venner, would not be available.  If the child's direct evidence in chief is not admissible, it follows that his or her cross-examination would not be admissible either.  Where trauma to the child is at issue, there would be little point in sparing the child the need to testify in chief, (the first questioning by the prosecutor) only to have him or her grilled in cross-examination. (by the defence lawyer) While there may be cases where, as a condition of admission, the trial judge thinks it possible and fair in all the circumstances to permit cross-examination of the child as the condition of the reception of a hearsay statement, in most cases the concerns of the accused as to credibility will remain to be addressed by submissions as to the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and submissions as to the quality of any corroborating evidence.

Generally, if an accused gives answers to his lawyer while testifying, and then refuses to be questioned by the prosecutor, the judge will disregard the testimony he gave while answering the questions by his lawyer. However, that doesn`t mean that he can`t make a statement to the judge or jury that isn`t under oath.  However, such a statement is apt to not be taken too seriously if he refused to be questioned by the prosecutor while under oath.

One day when I was practicing law, during a civil trial, I represented a six-year-old child who had been physically assaulted by an adult who was not related to the child. While I was asking the child what had happened, he began to cry. The judge decided that it would be better if he accepted the testimony of what the mother saw happening when her child was being assaulted by the adult. After her testimony, the adult was deemed to have assaulted the child and an award of damages was ordered against the adult.

 Quite frankly, I must say that I do not understand Ares v. Venner where the court held that the hearsay evidence there at issue was admissible where necessity and reliability are established only where cross-examination is available.  First, the Court adopted the views of the dissenting judges in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions which do not make admissibility dependent on the right to cross-examine.  Second, the cross-examination referred to in Ares v. Venner was of limited value.  The nurses were present in court at the trial, but in the absence of some way of connecting particular nurses with particular entries, meaningful cross-examination on the accuracy of specific observations would have been difficult indeed.

Justice Robins  hearing this appeal which is the t0pic of this article said;  “I conclude that hearsay evidence of a child's statement on crimes committed against the child should be received, provided that the guarantees of necessity and reliability are met, subject to such safeguards as the judge may consider necessary and subject always to considerations affecting the weight that should be accorded to such evidence. This does not make out-of-court statements by children generally admissible; in particular the requirement of necessity will probably mean that in most cases children will still be called to give viva voce (verbal) evidence.”  unquote

He also said, “I have also concluded that the mother's statement in the case at bar (during this trial) should have been received.  It was necessary since the child's viva voce (oral) evidence having been rejected.  The child had no motive to falsify her story to her mother which emerged naturally and without prompting.  Moreover, the fact that she could not be expected to have knowledge of such sexual acts imbues her statement with its own peculiar version of reliability.  Finally, her statement was corroborated by real evidence.   Having said this, I note that it may not be necessary to enter the statement on a new trial, if the child's viva voce (word of mouth) evidence can be received as suggested in the first part of my reasons.” unquote

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sex offender’s appeal and ordered a new trial.

I can’t find anything in the internet referring to his second trial but I am convinced that he will be found guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Further, there is no doubt in my mind that his licence to practice as a medical doctor will be permanently cancelled by the Ontario College of Physicians and surgeons.

As an aside, when I was eleven years of age, I was the victim of an anal rape by my father. He moved out of our town the next day and moved to Toronto.  I never told my mother what he had done to me while she was visiting her sister out of town for two months. I didn’t want to saddle her with guilt for having left me for those two months. To her dying day when she died at age 91 in 2003, she never knew what he had done to me.  If I had told her, she would have believed me because my birth was the direct result of my father having raped her in January 1933.     In 1946 when I was twelve, I and three other boys in a group home were all anal raped by the man that ran the group home. I don’t know what happened to him after that but I and the other boys were sent to live in other homes. After that, no one sexually abused me although when I was thirteen, another man tried it and got nowhere with his attempt.

Child abuse is a common scourge in society. Many years ago, I was invited to address a legislative committee dealing with child sex abuse. In my address, I said that 25% of children are sexually abused by family members. I was wrong. Far more children are sexually abused by family members.  The percentage of abusers is 70%

The most-often reported form of incest is father–daughter and stepfather–daughter incest, with most of the remaining reports consisting of mother/stepmother–daughter/son incest. Father–son incest is reported less often; however it is not known if the actual prevalence is less or it is under-reported by a greater margin. Similarly, some argue that sibling incest may be as common, or more common, than other types of incest.  It has been reported by one source   that 57% of incest involved siblings. another source reported that over 90% of family incest involved siblings while a third source showed that sibling incest was reported twice as often as incest that is perpetrated by fathers/stepfathers.

The global prevalence of child sexual abuse has been estimated at 19.7% for girls and 7.9% for boys. Most sexual abuse offenders are acquainted with their victims; approximately 30% are relatives of the child, most often brothers, fathers, uncles, or  cousins and   around 60% are other acquaintances, such as friends of the family, babysitters, or neighbors; strangers who are also the offenders in approximately 10% of child sexual abuse cases.  Most child sexual abuse is committed by men.  Studies on female child molesters show that women commit 14% to 40% of offenses reported against boys and 6% of offenses reported against girls.

Incest between a child or adolescent and a related adult is known as child incestuous abuse and has been identified as the most widespread form of child sexual abuse with a huge capacity to damage the young person. One researcher stated that more than 70% of abusers are immediate family members or someone very close to the family. Another researcher stated that about 30% of all perpetrators of sexual abuse are related to their victim, 60% of the perpetrators are family acquaintances, like a neighbor, babysitter or friend and 10% of the perpetrators in child sexual abuse cases are strangers. A child sexual abuse offense where the perpetrator is related to the child, either by blood or marriage, is a form of incest described as intrafamilial child sexual abuse

The prevalence of parental child sexual abuse is difficult to assess due to secrecy and privacy however some estimates state that 20 million Americans have been victimized by parental incest when they were children. Can you imagine how many children are sexually abused in the world by their fathers and other male family members? The numbers must be mind boggling. 

Studies have found that 51% to 79% of sexually abused children exhibit psychological symptoms. After I was sexually abused by the man who raped me in his group home, the Children’s Aid sent me to a psychologist. I refused to tell him what my father and the man in the group did to me as I was too embarrassed to say anything about the abuse inflicted on me by those two men.  It was only when I was in my seventies that I wasn’t that embarrassed enough that I couldn’t tell anyone what those two men had done to me.  How many adults in this current time in history have kept silent all these years and are still keeping silent?

Dr. Khan was convicted at his second trial.  I don’t know what his sentence was. His license to practice medicine was revoked by the Ontario College of Physicians.  He appealed that decision to the Ontario Appeal Court in 1992. The court reaffirmed his revocation to practice medicine.

I hope that you have found this article informative and interesting to boot.