A STRANGE RELIGIOUS BELIEF
This is a very long but interesting article and
much pf this article deals with the protection of children in their homes.
I will admit from the beginning of this article that I am an atheist.
Notwithstanding that, I accept many of the teachings in the Christian Bible as
being very valid and for that reason; I try to live by them.
However, there are people in this world of ours who have very weird
religious beliefs. This article is about the parents of a child whose religious
beliefs are really strange. It was how they expressed their beliefs in a courtroom
ands by email that was truly weird.
In order to protect the name of the child, I will refer to her as “CJ”
and her parents as “The Parents” or “Mother” or “Father” or by their initials.
On November 14, 2017, the
Provincial Court of British Columbia found that a child, C.J., was in need
of protection and ordered that C.J. be placed in the continuing custody of the
Director of Child, Family and Community Service. The parents appealed that
decision.
The
appellants allege a number of errors in law. These alleged errors include:
1. the
trial judge failed to find that the Director discriminated against the
appellants contrary to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms[Charter];
2. section 40 of
the Act requires
that s. 13 be
applied and given as a reason for the protection order; the trial judge did not
state the specific grounds for the protection order, as required under s. 13;
4. the
trial judge did not identify the reasons for the continuing custody order
pursuant to s. 41(2)(a), (b) or (c);
5. the
appellants did not consent to the trial judge’s order granting continuing
custody to the Director as is required pursuant to s. 50.1(2)(a), and he
made an order contrary to s. 50.1(2)(c); and
6. the
appellants were treated unfairly by the trial judge.
Ultimately,
the appellants (parents) wanted their child returned to them immediately.
The appellants are the biological mother,
A.J., and biological father, D.K., of C.J., who was born November 1, 2016.
The
appellants are Christians and their view of Christianity informs all aspects of
their lives. Both parents come from religious families.
The father, D.K., grew up in
Maple Ridge and was home-schooled. He was later involved in missionary work in
Mexico with his family. In his early 20s he had a falling out with his parents
and returned to British Columbia. He spent several years in and out of work,
abusing alcohol and drugs, and living on the streets. At some point he returned
to his Christian values and became involved with A.J his wife.
The
mother, A.J., was born in Ontario. She went to private Christian schools in
Toronto and in Ottawa. She also distanced herself from religion in her young
adult years. However, in 2012 A.J. returned to her Christian roots and attended
the Pacific Life Bible College in Surrey, BC.
A.J.
and D.K. met in April 2014. Their initial attraction appears to have largely
been their mutual interest in the teachings of Christ. Sometime in 2015, the
couple was privately married. This marriage is not sanctioned by the province
but they believe it is sealed by the Holy Spirit under God’s law. Legally,
their relationship is referred to as a common-law relationship.
The
couple have had unstable working and living arrangements, and have a history of
alienating friends and church members. On a number of occasions they have been
told they are not welcome in various churches. This typically occurs after
they attempt to purge churches of evil influences. It appears that due to
their strong religious beliefs, they are intolerant of those who do not espouse
identical views. This includes other Christians.
The
couple have lived in a number of different areas including Surrey, Pemberton,
Kelowna and Peachland. In early 2016, A.J. moved to Peachland without D.K. due
to conflict with the individuals with whom they were living in Pemberton. There
was also conflict between A.J. and D.K.
In
March or April 2016, A.J. discovered that she was pregnant. On April 21, 2016,
she started attending a West Kelowna maternity clinic (the “Maternity Clinic”)
which supports homebirths. In October 2016, D.K. moved to Peachland to live
with A.J.
The
couple has a history of arguing, and on at least one occasion their argument
became violent. Although A.J. initially reported these violent incidents,
she later denied them.
The
initial report was as follows. While attending the Bridges Lunch Program,
A.J. disclosed to the facilitator of the lunch program that her husband
choked her by grabbing her throat to stop her from crying. A.J. disclosed
that her husband had done this more than once and that he had tied her hands
and covered her mouth with tape, which scared her. She disclosed that D.K.
regularly beat her. A.J. also stated that her husband grew up in a cult,
that he believes sexual relations between children should be encouraged, and
that she believes the abuse she was experiencing is “spiritual warfare”. The appellants
role-play these sins where she plays the victim and he plays the perpetrator.
A.J. was later interviewed
by the police and she denied any such assaults. However, on November 2, 2016,
after the child’s birth, A.J. was interviewed by a social worker about the
alleged violence. She advised that D.K. had put his hands around her neck and
brought her down to the floor. On the same day, a social worker interviewed
D.K. about the allegation. D.K. said the incident occurred on
his birthday, that they were arguing and he felt he was not being heard by
A.J. He became frustrated with her and had a few drinks to calm himself.
Later, to quieten her down, he put his hand around her throat and his other
hand over her mouth but he did not hurt her.
A.J. also
stated that her husband grew up in a cult, that he believes sexual relations
between children should be encouraged, and that she believes the abuse she was
experiencing is “spiritual warfare”. The appellants role-play these sins where
she plays the victim and he plays the perpetrator.
A.J.
was later interviewed by the police and she denied any such assaults. However,
on November 2, 2016, after the child’s birth, A.J. was interviewed by a social
worker about the alleged violence. She advised that D.K. had put his hands
around her neck and brought her down to the floor. On the same day, a social
worker interviewed D.K. about the allegation. D.K. said the incident occurred
on his birthday, that they were arguing and he felt he was not being heard
by A.J. He became frustrated with her and had a few drinks to calm
himself. Later, to quieten her down, he put his hand around her throat and his
other hand over her mouth but he did not hurt her.
As
a result of the reported violence, on October 27, 2016 a complaint was made to
the Ministry of Children and Family Development (the “Ministry”).
In
addition to the domestic violence concerns, the Director heard concerns
regarding the care of the child. The first issue was with respect to A.J.’s
insistence that the birth be a homebirth. At the outset this was not
problematic. However, due to difficulties A.J. was having with the staff at the
Maternity Clinic, it was determined that it would be best to have the baby
delivered in the hospital. There was a lot of back-and-forth between the
parents, the social workers, and the Ministry because the parents did not
accept the decision that the baby be delivered in the hospital.
Dr. Hautala from the Maternity Clinic called the Ministry because she now
had concerns about A.J.’s mental health.
Ultimately,
the appellants chose to continue with a homebirth without any medical
attention. This arrangement was unacceptable to the Ministry. The Maternity
Clinic also did not recommend a medically unsupported home delivery.
On
the day of the actual birth, A.J.’s parents were present. After unsuccessfully
encouraging the appellants to get medical attention, A.J.’s parents went to a
neighbour’s home and asked the neighbour to call 911 for emergency assistance.
The paramedics arrived shortly thereafter. The father D.K. did the delivery,
following the instructions of a paramedic.
After
the delivery, the baby was transferred to the hospital. The trial judge was
concerned that a number of medical procedures were offered to the parents to
assess the health of both the baby and the mother, and all of these
procedures were refused by A.J.
At
the same time that the baby was taken to the hospital, the Ministry
unsuccessfully took steps to have A.J.’s mental health assessed.
Dr. Hautala was concerned with A.J.’s mental health and her ability to
provide safe care to the infant, and felt that “the inflexible beliefs of the
mother would make her unable to make good decisions for the baby” (paragaph. 45).
The
trial judge noted at paragraph 60 that A.J. refused all of the following
medical procedures: the usual Rhogan blood product used to avoid A.J.’s body
making antibodies against future pregnancies, which was recommended because
A.J. had RH positive blood; routine pre-natal vitamins; routine cervical pap
screening; routine blood-sugar testing; GBS screening; a vaginal exam prior to
birth; a vitamin K shot for the baby after birth; eye drops for the baby after
birth; a bilirubin blood test for the baby; a common hearing test; and RH
testing for the baby. A.J. also expressed unwillingness to allow the child to
receive vaccinations.
Due
to concerns regarding family violence and mental health, a family intervention
specialist was assigned to work with the family. This specialist worker had a
Master’s degree in social work with a background of working with people with
potential mental health difficulties. Additionally, because the family was
being investigated for potential domestic violence, the parents reluctantly
signed a voluntary care agreement on November 7, 2016 to avoid the child being
removed from them without their consent. The child was transferred from the
hospital to the home of foster parents.
After
signing the voluntary care agreement, the parents were able to see
the baby several days a week. A.J. was breast-feeding the child. She was
also expressing milk for the baby who was in the care of foster parents. A.J.
did not want the child receiving any food other than her breast milk.
On
December 7, 2016, there was a case planning conference. In that meeting it was
acknowledged that the parents had attended their access visits regularly and
they had expressed a willingness to accept community supports. Although there
were still a number of concerns, the Director was prepared to allow the baby to
return home if community supports were put in place.
On
December 8, 2016, the baby was returned to the parents. One of the conditions
in the community support agreement was that the parents would abstain from the
use of alcohol and illegal drugs. At the time of the exchange, the father
became upset regarding the requirement that he remain alcohol-free.
The
next issue that arose regarded the weight of the baby. The mother was feeding
the baby 100% breast milk. This was contrary to the advice of the lactation
specialist, who had advised of the need, during the transition, to provide
formula top-up feedings. A midwife had also emphasized the importance of
allowing the formula top-up if the baby was hungry. In response A.J. stated
that she believed the baby had to work for her food and the formula milk had
unhealthy impurities for the baby.
There
were many discussions between the authorities and the family regarding A.J.’s
refusal to allow formula top-up feeding. D.K. secretly did some formula top-ups
but this created conflict between the parents. The mother had dumped into the
sink the formula on at least one occasion. The mother also stated that the
father was projecting his addiction onto the baby by allowing her to drink
formula because he was not allowed to drink alcohol.
The
parents were to bring the baby into a clinic for scheduled visits.
On December 13, 2016, the baby was weighed at the clinic. A loss was noted
of 3.5 ounces over four days since the last weigh-in. Although the
testimony and charts did not conclusively demonstrate that the baby was losing
weight in their care, the medical professionals were concerned regarding the
refusal to give the baby formula and whether the baby was thriving in the care
of her parents.
On
December 15, 2016, the child was formally removed from the home. The baby
went back to the foster parents and gained weight.
On February 9, 2017, an
interim s. 35 order was made, placing the child in the custody of the
Director and granting the parents reasonable access, supervised at the discretion
of the Director. There were some concerns raised during these supervised
visits, although on the appeal court’s review of the evidence and exhibits
these concerns may have been overstated. What is clear is that when questioned
about parenting skills, the father got aggressive. This occurred on February
14, 2017 and the RCMP (provincial police) had to be called to attend. Following
this visit, access was terminated until the parents signed a conduct agreement.
On
March 8, 2017, the matter was in Provincial Court for the commencement of the
protection hearing. The Director also spoke to an application for a parental
capacity assessment. The parents were asked by the court if they would
participate in the assessment and they declined. No parental capacity
assessment was ordered at the time.
On
April 28, 2017, A.J. sent an email to a social worker, Melanie Crowston,
to schedule future access dates but also wrote the following:
“God is doing a great work
here. And believe me; you want the wicked and corrupt things addressed, because
everyone suffers when evil is allowed to harm you and families. So we need
Jesus to clean up the corruption and bring justice back to this place. How
filthy and corrupt your job is and the people you work for. I am ashamed for you.
It is evil. I’m sorry you work for such an ugly corrupted company too.”
As
evidenced by this email, the parents continued to have difficulty working
cooperatively with others. The mother often demonized those seeking to help
her. For example, the parents were asked to leave the parish they were
attending. On April 29, 2017, the pastor, on the recommendation of the
church leadership, called the police to see what steps were needed to get a
restraining order against the appellants. The parents returned to the church on
May 3, 2017 and caused another disturbance at a support group meeting. The
pastor then sent the parents an email indicating that they were no longer
welcome to attend the church.
On
May 10, 2017, A.J. sent an email to them in which the counsel (lawyer) for the
Director stating the following:
“Be
prepared for your house to see a very large debt come across and bankruptcy due
to the criminal charges against the court system and the ministry of children
and youth and particularly the judicial system that has imposed the degradation
of children and harm to the families. The Lord Jesus has now come in to judge
and he has seen the demise of what He had set in place for good has now been
corrupted and covered in greed and filth.” unquote
The
trial judge stated that the email “could be perceived as threatening”.
At this stage, correspondence was being directed through the office of the
Director because the parents refused to communicate with the social worker.
On
May 17, 2017, there was a disturbance at the Emmanuelle Church in West Kelowna.
The police became involved. The trial judge heard evidence from a youth
pastor and an RCMP officer who were present at the May 17th disturbance.
The parents were arrested and criminally charged for the disturbance. D.K.
cooperated with the arrest but A.J. “rolled around on the ground” and did not
cooperate. The parents allegedly wanted to cleanse the Church of evil
influences. On that same day the parents had a scheduled access visit with
their child, but they missed the visit because they were in custody. At this
point the Ministry decided to apply to court to ensure that the parents had no
further access. The Director was firm in its position that a continuing care
order in the first instance was in the best interests of the child.
On
July 27, 2017, the parents attended the Kelowna Police detachment for a
supervised visit. The father had a subpoena he wanted to serve on a social
worker and became upset when the other social worker would not accept it on her
behalf. This resulted in tension in the room and arguments by the parents. The
father continued to argue loudly despite being asked to stop by the social
worker, but the visit eventually ended without incident.
On
August 3, 2017, the protection hearing continued. The trial judge ordered that
the parents participate in a parental capacity assessment. The trial judge
further ordered that the parents have no further parenting time until they
complied with the order for the assessment. The hearing was adjourned to
October 16, 2017.
At
the October hearing, the trial judge heard that the parents continued
to attend churches with the goal of cleansing them from demonic
influences. The parents had also refused to participate in the parental
capacity assessment.
At
trial, A.J. testified that she had an application pending to change the name of
the child. She wanted C.J. to have a hyphenated first name including Jesus and
a middle name of JoyoftheLord. She was also applying for a change in her
first name to the Risen Lord Jesus–A, a new middle name of Refinersfire–Deanne,
and a change in her last name to add the name Christ.
One
last issue in this case was the conduct of the appellants at trial. First, they
refused legal aid assistance and maintained that their legal counsel was the
Lord Jesus. Second, the parents verbalized words that were not discernible to
the court; they appeared to be speaking in tongues. They spoke in tongues to
their stuffed animal, a lion, and claimed that through this lion they were
hearing directly from their counsel the Lord. Third, when cross-examining
witnesses, the appellants advised each witness that it was their lawyer Jesus
Christ asking the questions through the voice of the parent. Fourth, the trial
judge found the parents not to be credible witnesses.
Surely
by now, you have (as I have) presumed that this particular couple are in need
of psychiatric treatment. That is the nice way to say it. Another way to say it is that these two
parents are as nutty as a fruit cake in which the nuts are prominent in the
cake.
From
the outset, the Director has had protection concerns regarding the capacity of
the appellants to parent. There had been concerns regarding mental health,
domestic violence, an unwillingness to follow medical directions for the child,
and an inability to cooperate with those who could support them.
The
appropriate standard of review of court decisions to be applied by the BC
Supreme Court on appeal is pursuant to s. 81 of
the Act
in which it says;
“The
scope of appellate review, pursuant to s. 81 of
the Act is
narrow. This Court does not re-hear the matter and substitute its own findings.
This Court can intervene only if the trial judge made an error of law or
seriously misapprehended the evidence. There must be an error in principle, a
failure to consider all relevant factors, a consideration of an irrelevant
factor or a lack of factual support for the judgment.” unquote
The
question of custody of an infant is a matter which peculiarly lies within the
discretion of the trial judge who hears the case and has the opportunity (generally
denied to an appellate tribunal) of seeing the parties and investigating the
infant’s circumstances, and that his decision should not be disturbed unless he
has clearly acted on some wrong principle or disregarded material evidence.
The
appeal is not a trial de novo. (new trial) There cannot be a review
of the evidence before the Learned Trial Judge and a substitution of a
judgment. The decision cannot be set aside unless I the appeal court finds that
the Learned Trial Judge made an error at law, erred in principle, disregarded
significant material evidence that there was a lack of factual support for the
judgment, or that the award was clearly wrong. It is clear that the scope of
appellate review is narrow and the trial judge is entitled to considerable
deference. (consideration of his or her decision) All Courts of Appeal can only
intervene where the trial judge made an error of law, seriously misapprehended
the evidence, did not take all relevant factors into account or considered
irrelevant factors, or the decision lacked a factual foundation.
Where
the main issue is what is the best interests of a child, all relevant factors
must be considered in determining the child’s best interests, including for
example:
(a)
the child’s safety;
(b)
the child’s physical and emotional needs and level of development;
(c)
the importance of continuity in the child’s care;
(d)
the quality of the relationship the child has with a parent or other person and
the effect of maintaining that relationship;
(e)
the child’s cultural, racial, linguistic and religious heritage;
(f)
the child’s views;
(g)
the effect on the child if there is delay in making a decision.
A
child needs protection in the following circumstances:
(a)
if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed by the child’s
parent;
(b)
if the child has been, or is likely to be, sexually abused or exploited by the
child’s parent;
(c)
if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed, sexually abused
or sexually exploited by another person and if the child’s parent is unwilling
or unable to protect the child;
(d)
if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed because of neglect
by the child’s parent;
(e)
if the child is emotionally harmed by
(i)
the parent’s conduct, or
(ii)
living in a situation where there is domestic violence by or towards a
person with whom the child resides;
(f)
if the child is deprived of necessary health care;
(g)
if the child’s development is likely to be seriously impaired by a treatable
condition and the child’s parent refuses to provide or consent to treatment;
(h) if the child’s parent is unable or unwilling
to care for the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care;
(i)
if the child is or has been absent from home in circumstances that endanger the
child’s safety or well-being;
(j)
if the child’s parent is dead and adequate provision has not been made for the
child’s care;
(k)
if the child has been abandoned and adequate provision has not been made for
the child’s care;
(l)
if the child is in the care of a director or another person by agreement and
the child’s parent is unwilling or unable to resume care when the agreement is
no longer in force.
The
Court of Appeal had to deal with a number of issues. The first one was—
1. Was
it a legal error for the trial judge to find that the Director did not
discriminate against the appellants?
The
appellants did not set out, beyond the mere assertion, how they have been
discriminated against as a family. They stated in their reply: “We request our
Rights as Christian parents to be not discriminated in our way to care for our
Child.” They note the trial judge stated that he was himself a Christian and
did not have an issue with their Christian family values. From this they concluded
that the trial judge had no issue with their way of parenting. From their
submissions, it is unclear where exactly the discrimination on the basis of
religion is alleged to have occurred.
A
fair reading of the decision established that the trial judge considered the
issue of discrimination on the basis of religion. The trial judge rejected that
claim, stating that religion was not on trial.
The
issues raised in the appeal is not about the parent’s freedom of religion.
Naturally they have that freedom, as do all members of our society. Christians
continue making up a significant portion of Canada’s overall population and
collectively are in no way seen as having negative parenting values.
Christianity is not on trial.
Further,
the parent’s belief in direct revelation from God or in using the gift of
tongues is not on trial. Home birthing is not on trial. The right not to use
vaccinations or have ones child not use vaccinations is not on trial.
The
parents made it abundantly clear throughout in their appeal hearing that they believe t that the only
reason their child had been removed was because those making the child
protection decisions are persecuting them (parents) because of their Christian
beliefs. They are entitled to that opinion, but that is not the view of the Appeal
Court in this matter.
With
respect to the Director’s concerns regarding mental health, the appellants
pointed out that this could be discrimination based on disability.
They stated that people with disabilities have the right to have children,
but they may need some supports. The comment about the need for support is
valid but the trial judge addressed this point. The trial judge specifically
discussed whether the parents could take care of the child with the proper
supports in place.
However,
the trial judge found that the parents rejected support because they tended to
demonize those who have tried to help them with parenting such as churches,
Christian families and social workers. The trial judge was of the opinion that
putting supports in place was no longer a viable option.
None
of the appellants’ assertions make any connection, much less a nexus, between
the Charter rights
and freedoms alleged to be violated and the concerns of the Director which were
accepted by the trial judge.
The
appellants had not proven discrimination against them as a Christian family or
on the basis of disability. The trial judge was correct to reject the
discrimination argument.
Did the trial judge err in
not providing reasons before granting the protection order?
The appellants alleged that
the trial judge erred by not stating the precise protection concern as required
under the Act.
Although the trial judge could have been more precise, he certainly
articulated the reasons for granting the continuing custody order. He
first referred to the law and the guiding principles in the Act.
The
law is clear. The court follows the guiding principles set out in section two
of the Child, Family
and Community Service Act. The paramount consideration is
the safety and well-being of the child. If with proper supports the safety and
well-being of the child can be met in the home of the parents, then the family
is the preferred environment for the care and upbringing of the child.
The
trial judge stated that the Director was relying on the likelihood
of physical harm to the child based on the parents’ neglect] and the
parents’ inability or unwillingness to properly care for the child in arguing
that the child was in need of protection. That his findings were based
on the Act was
implicit in his analysis and his conclusion the child is in need of protection.
One of the obvious examples
of the trial judge’s reasons is where he noted that there is some level of
family violence. He found that although the evidence was somewhat inconsistent,
there was certainly evidence of ongoing conflict between the parents. At trial,
A.J. denied that she made the allegations apart from conceding that D.K. had
covered her mouth with his hand. D.K. (the father) testified that to stop
her from screaming and crying, he went upstairs and put his hand over her mouth
and told her to be quiet. He denied ever choking her or assaulting her or tying
her up. The trial judge found that both parents lacked credibility with respect
to this testimony. The trial judge also discussed the expert testimony
regarding the impact of domestic violence on children. The trial judge’s
concern regarding domestic violence fits within the Act.
The
trial judge also set out the concerns with A.J.’s mental health consistent
with the Act.
While the appellants stated that it was not reasonable for the trial judge to
find mental health concerns, the findings regarding mental health were based on
the record (e.g., testimony of Dr. Hautala). The appellants stated that
the concerns regarding the mental health of A.J. were based on the fact that
she speaks in tongues. If it were just based on A.J. speaking in tongues they
might have a point, but there were other behaviours raising mental health
issues such as the conflict A.J. has with all those around her, including other
Christians and her parents. In any event, if A.J. wanted to demonstrate she had
no mental health issues, her opportunity would have been to undergo a
parental capacity assessment. Despite this being ordered by the court, both
parents refused to undergo the assessment. The trial judge discussed the
difficulty that put the court had.
The
trial judge was mindful that the Act states
that the family is the preferred environment for the child if, with supports,
it can provide a safe and nurturing environment The trial judge discussed
whether the parents could take care of the child with the proper supports in
place.
The
trial judge found that the parents had limited support because they had
conflict with those who could have helped them with parent in—churches,
Christian families, their parents, midwives and doctors, social workers and anyone holding a position of authority over
them. The trial judge noted that the parents could have had the support of a
freely appointed lawyer, but they instead chose to claim that Jesus Christ was
their lawyer, and also that Jesus Christ was their only witness. Their
statements are proof that there is something very wrong in their thinking.
I
have to presume that they really believed that Jesus was really alive and speaking
to them in their minds and advising them how to defend themselves during the
trial and that Jesus told them that what they did was not morally or legally
wrong.
Back
in 1971 and 1972, I studied abnormal psychology at the University of Toronto. I
also counselled mentally ill prisoners in a correctional facility in Toronto
for a year. This certainly doesn`t make me an expert in this subject but I do
know enough to comment on this issue.
A delusion is a false,
unshakeable idea or belief, which is out of keeping with a person`s
educational, cultural and social background. A delusion is held with
extraordinary conviction and subjective certainty. A delusion is experienced as
an everyday notion or assumption rather than a belief. This is quite unlike a
subjective religious view. A deluded person quite matter-of-factly declares
herself to be able to communicate directly to Jesus or some other religious
entity. It is not a credible statement
but merely a comment on how the person views reality.
Delusions are always self-referent which is
the belief or notion that always has something to do with oneself. Of course,
all religions, and especially this particular couples` spiritual belief is extremely personal. One who
is highly religious does not have delusions about remote places or times
without it having some reference to an entity that is greater than that person
Delusions have generally been classified according to their content and
religious delusions are just one of many kinds of delusions that are frequent and often highly significant.
Religion often forms the content of other types of delusion, for example,
persecutory delusions or delusional misidentification.
Even though what is believed about Jesus
that he was a real person is factually correct. A famous historian in the times when Jesus was
alive stated in one of his reports that Jesus was a Jew who was put to death on
the orders of Pontius Pilate. Jesus really existed. That is a fact. On the
other hand; it is a delusion if a person claims he or she communicates with
Jesus in this current era.
Psychopathologically speaking, a delusion
cannot be shared between two persons. If
one parent really believes that he or she is communicating with Jesus which is
a figment of their imagination, one parent won`t see Jesus in the same manner
as the other parent. They may mouth their beliefs in conjunction but that is
all it is—mouthing what the other parents says.
Religious delusions do not only occur in
people who don’t attend religious services and yet are
regarded as being religious, they also encompass organized religion, church,
temples or mosque attenders also. It is the nature of delusion that the content
is of great personal significance to the deluded person. Now I will take you
back to the court decision.
The
trial judge found that the parents’ focus “is always centred on their perceived
calling as the mouthpiece of God, and they allow no room for seeing the world
through the lens of a child”, as evidenced for example by them choosing to
change the child’s name to “Jesus” and “Joyoftheworld”. Consistent with the Act,
the trial judge was concerned that the parents were unwilling to follow the
medical advice of doctors at the time of the birth, the medical advice when the
baby was taken to the hospital following the birth, and the advice of medical
professionals regarding the need to top up the baby’s breast-feeding with
formula when the child was living with the parents.
There
were were other concerns to establish that permanent removal is in the best
interests of the child.
Orders
made at the protection hearing
If
the court found that the child needed protection, it must make one of the following
orders in the child’s best interests:
(a) that
the child be returned to or remain in the custody of the parent apparently
entitled to custody and be under the director’s supervision for a specified
period of up to 6 months;
(b) that
the child be placed in the custody of a person other than a parent with the
consent of the other person and under the director’s supervision, for a
specified period in accordance with section 43;
(c) that
the child remains or be placed in the custody of the director for a specified
period in accordance with section 43;
(d) that
the child be placed in the continuing custody of the director.
(1.1) When
an order is made under subsection (1) (b) or (c), the court may order that on
the expiry of the order under subsection (1) (b) or (c) the child
(a) be
returned to the parent, and
(b) be
under the director’s supervision for a specified period of up to 6 months.
(2) The
court must not order under subsection (1) (d) that the child be placed in the
continuing custody of the director unless—
(a) the
identity or location of a parent of the child has not been found after a
diligent search and is not likely to be found,
(b) a
parent is unable or unwilling to resume custody of the child, or
c) the
nature and extent of the harm the child has suffered or the likelihood that the
child will suffer harm is such that there is little prospect it would be in the
child’s best interests to be returned to the parent.
If an order was made under
section 33.2 (2), the child has not been removed since that order was made and
the court finds that the child needs protection, the court must order that the
director supervise the child’s care for a specified period of up to 6 months.
Based on the foregoing, it was
clear that there was sufficient evidence before the trial judge to allow him to
come to the conclusion that a continuing custody order was warranted in the
circumstances. No further hearing was necessary
The court of Appeal agreed with the findings of the family court judge. The
appeal by the parents was dismissed.
No comments:
Post a Comment