WAS THE PENALTY PROPER
AGAINST THE DOCTOR?
Dr. Peirovy practiced medicine in a medical clinic in the Province of
Ontario in Canada. In that province like other provinces in Canada, there are administrative
tribunals that govern the conduct of medical doctors. In Ontario, it is called,
the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Like
all other similar Colleges, it has a Discipline Committee that comprises of
doctors who decide the fate of doctors who are accused of wrongdoings in their
practices.
The College received a series of complaints by this doctor’s patients
who were examined by Dr. Peirovy in his
office and in a clinic. His
misconduct involved the sexual abuse of four female patients and inappropriate
conduct with respect to a fifth at a walk-in family medicine clinic in 2009 and
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The allegations against him
included claims that while examining patients with a stethoscope, he cupped
patients’ breasts, touched patients’ nipples, placed his stethoscope directly
on patients’ nipples and in one instance “tweaked” or squeezed a patient’s
nipple.
The
female breast is private and sensitive both physiologically and emotionally.
Female patients have a right to expect that physicians will understand and
respect their privacy when examinations of this nature are being conducted. A
violation of the sexual integrity of a patient, including the deliberate
touching of a patient’s breast without her consent and for no proper medical
reason, constitutes sexual abuse.
Dr.
Peirovy’s conduct constituted violations of the sexual integrity of the
complainants, regardless of his motivation, considering his deliberate touching
of the complainants’ private and sensitive areas without their consent and for
no necessary medical reason.
The trouble with these medical sex offenders is that they let their penis control
their minds.
The
Discipline Committee therefore found Dr. Peirovy guilty of sexual abuse in
relation to the four patients. In each case, the abusive conduct consisted of
medically unnecessary touching of the breast or nipples of the patients during
medically required chest examinations conducted using a stethoscope.
The
Discipline Committee also found that Dr. Peirovy had asked a fifth patient on a
date immediately following his medical examination of her during which her
breasts were exposed. While not found to be sexual abuse, that conduct, as well
as the four sexual abuse incidents, constituted disgraceful, dishonourable and
unprofessional conduct.
The
Discipline Committee was also informed that Dr. Peirovy had previously pleaded
guilty in a court to simple assault of two of the complainants in relation to
these same incidents. These convictions, for which Dr. Peirovy received a
conditional discharge, were considered relevant to his suitability to practice.
The Discipline Committee considered these convictions to be proof of professional
misconduct.
Several months later, the
Discipline Committee held a separate hearing on penalty during which it heard
evidence from two experts: Dr. Rootenberg, a forensic psychiatrist, who
specializes in the assessment and treatment of persons who have committed
sexual and other offences, including their risk of re-offending; and Dr.
Martin, an educational consultant in the Office of Post-Graduate Medicine at
the University of Toronto with a PhD in curriculum teaching and learning, who
specializes in assisting physicians with patient communications, boundary
awareness and maintenance and remediation training and has provided remedial
training to over 100 physicians on referral from the College. Their
qualification as experts in these areas was not challenged by Dr. Peirovy.
The
Discipline Committee accepted the expert evidence of Dr. Rootenberg that
Dr. Peirovy did not meet the diagnostic criteria for psychopathology or sexual
deviance, which, he testified, is relevant with respect to relapse and
prevention. Dr. Rootenberg’s opinion was based on numerous sources, including
assessment interviews he conducted with Dr. Peirovy, assessment interviews
conducted by a forensic psychologist and forensic social worker, and
information obtained from collateral sources including the managers of the two
medical clinics where Dr. Peirovy currently practices. Dr. Rootenberg also drew
from the Discipline Committee’s liability decision, and the evidence given and
exhibits filed at the liability hearing.
The
Discipline Committee also accepted the expert evidence that the risk of
Dr. Peirovy re-offending by committing further sexual transgressions in
the future was low. In Dr. Rootenberg’s view, Dr. Peirovy had worked hard
to understand his inappropriate behaviour, was very embarrassed and ashamed of
what he had done, and was sincere in his desire that this not happen again.
I realize that some of my readers will feel that
once a doctor commits any form of sexual
abuse, he should have his licence revoked.
It
comes down to just how serious the abuse was and how often it was done. Any
sexual abuse is serious but there are degrees of seriousness. In my opinion,
this man’s sexual abuse was in the low end of seriousness. If there was no hope
of him reforming, then he should have his licence revoked. However, the
specialists who interviewed him came to the conclusion that he will no longer
be a danger to his patients and I am not qualified to say that they were wrong
in their conclusions.
Dr.
Martin’s expert evidence was relevant to the issues of remediation and risk
management that the Discipline Committee was required to consider in
determining the appropriate penalty. She highlighted deficits in Dr. Peirovy’s
interactive skills with patients that give rise to the same risk factors of
misunderstanding by patients outlined by the experts who testified at the
liability hearing. The Discipline Committee agreed with Dr. Martin’s assessment
of Dr. Peirovy which it summarized as follows:
Dr.
Martin’s] assessment of Dr. Peirovy indicated that, in her opinion, he had
deficits in a number of areas. These included his interviewing skills, his
manner (which was described as awkward and clumsy), his verbal communication,
his awareness of issues pertaining to patient consent, his sensitivity to how
his patients were perceiving him, and how his behaviour was affecting his
patients. Dr. Martin also stated that Dr. Peirovy was largely unaware of
his professional responsibilities in maintaining appropriate boundaries in the
doctor/patient relationship.
The
Discipline Committee also accepted Dr. Martin’s opinion that Dr. Peirovy
had made good progress in remedying the deficits identified. She had worked
with him from August 2013 to June 2015. Dr. Martin reported that there had been
“huge professional maturation”. No concerns had been expressed by the practice
monitor. Although the Discipline Committee acknowledged the substantial
progress, it nonetheless felt further remediation work was needed as he had not
yet taken full responsibility for his actions.
With
the benefit of the expert evidence, the Discipline Committee was able to
conclude that some of the antecedents to Dr. Peirovy’s sexual misconduct were due
to “serious deficits in his communication skills, his sensitivity to the extent
of his patients’ vulnerability, and his understanding of boundaries and
consent.”
Although
the Discipline Committee acknowledged that those deficits “in no way diminish
or excuse the fact that he repeatedly subjected several patients to abusive
experiences”, the Discipline Committee found as a fact that “Dr. Peirovy’s
awkward, unskilled, and non-empathic manner with his female patients was a
factor in understanding his abusive behaviour.”
The
assessment of the Discipline Committee was however, that a full understanding
of Dr. Peirovy’s motivations remained unclear. The expert evidence effectively
ruled out psychopathology or sexual deviance, which the Discipline Committee found
lessened the risk of re-offence. However, while no finding of sexual motivation
was made, a degree of prurient interest in the patients could not be completely
excluded.
The
Discipline Committee then explained that the fact that four patients had been
subjected to sexual abuse in fairly close succession was an aggravating factor.
Based on the expert evidence, it declined however to infer that this was
indicative of “predatory intent or uncontrollable deviant urges on
Dr. Peirovy’s part”. It was at this point that the Discipline Committee suggested
that another possible inference that could explain why there were four patients
abused in close succession and that was that another possible inference was
that this pattern reflects a physician who was genuinely and completely unaware
of the ways in which his behaviour in relation to his patients was, in fact,
abusive. That certainly is a problem for both the doctor and his patients.
The
Discipline Committee ultimately suspended Dr. Peirovy’s licence for six months.
He was ordered to submit to a reprimand, and required to pay $64,240 for the
victims’ therapy costs and $35,680 in costs of the College’s proceedings. He
was also ordered to continue undergoing individualized instruction with Dr.
Martin that would focus on consent, boundaries, and doctor-patient
communications, and to complete a clinical education program focused on
physical examinations.
A number of restrictions
were also imposed on Dr. Peirovy’s return to practice. He was prohibited from
engaging in any encounter with female patients except under the supervision of
a practice monitor approved by the College.
He was also required to
post a sign in the waiting room and examination rooms at each of his practice
locations advising patients of this restriction. The practice monitor condition
could be reconsidered on an application to the Committee after a minimum of one
year following his return to practice.
Dr. Peirovy was also
required to tell patients how to access the Discipline Committee’s decision if
requested and to submit to unannounced inspections of his practice locations
and patient charts by the College in order to ensure compliance is being
followed.
The doctor wasn’t happy with the findings of the Discipline
Committee so he appealed to the Divisional Court in Toronto.
When anyone in Ontario works under the authority of
a non-government entity such as the College of Physicians and Surgeons and they don’t like what such a College ruled against
them, they can appeal to the Divisional Court for relief.
The Divisional Court is a branch
of the Superior Court of Justice and is one of the busiest appellate courts in
Canada. The Divisional Court hears statutory appeals from administrative
tribunals in the province, and is the primary forum for judicial review of
government action in Ontario. The Divisional Court also has some jurisdiction
regarding civil and family appeals. A proceeding is usually heard and
decided by a panel of three judges, but may be heard by a single judge in some
circumstances.
The issue before the Divisional Court was whether
or not the Discipline Committee made
an error in principle or the penalty was clearly unfit.
Specifically, the court rejected the Discipline
Committee’s suggestion that Dr. Peirovy’s unawareness as to how his behavior
was abusive could possibly explain the abuse of four patients.
According to the
Divisional Court, there was no line of analysis that could reasonably lead the
tribunal to conclude that Dr. Peirovy’s awkward, unskilled and non-empathic
manner was a factor in understanding his abusive behaviour or that it could
reasonably infer that he was genuinely and completely unaware of the ways in
which his behaviour in relation to his patients was in fact abusive.
This possible inference of unawareness drawn by the
Discipline Committee was, in the Divisional Court’s view, inconsistent with the
finding of fact that there were several offences. More importantly, the
inference was considered inconsistent with the Discipline Committee’s finding
at the liability stage that Dr. Peirovy had touched the complainants in a
way that an objective observer would find to be sexual and which the
complainants described as blatantly sexual.
In my opinion, there were several problems with
the Divisional Court’s concern. First, the Discipline Committee’s finding was
well supported by the testimony of the experts. This includes the College’s expert at the liability hearing, who
testified that touching a female patient’s nipple with either the hand or the
stethoscope during a lung examination should be avoided because it is medically
unnecessary and could be misinterpreted. In addition, the finding was supported
by the Discipline Committee’s assessment of Dr. Peirovy’s testimony.
Finally, the Discipline Committee did not, as the Divisional Court suggested,
find that Dr. Peirovy’s awkward, unskilled and non-empathic manner was the
only cause; it simply were of the opinion that it was a factor to consider.
The Discipline Committee specifically considered the
significance of the number of incidents. It rejected the inference that
Dr. Peirovy had a predatory intent or uncontrollable deviant urges on the
basis of the entire record and Dr. Rootenberg’s evidence. This finding was open
to the Discipline Committee, as was the inference that this improves the
prognosis and lessens the risk of re-offence. It was also open to the
Discipline Committee to suggest that the number of incidents, including one
that occurred after Dr. Peirovy was informed of a complaint against him,
might be explained by his lack of insight as to the abusive nature of his
conduct.
It is to be remembered that Dr. Peirovy’s culpability was
based on the finding of objectively sexual misconduct. The paramount principle
animating the penalty proceedings was, as the Discipline Committee recognized,
the protection of the public. In essence, the questions the Discipline
Committee had to answer were first, the appropriate sanction for the
misconduct, and second, whether it was safe to allow Dr. Peirovy to continue to
practice and, if so, what conditions he was subjected to.
The
Divisional Court advanced a second basis for it rejecting the Discipline
Committee’s suggestion that the several counts of sexual abuse could possibly
be explained by Dr. Peirovy’s genuine and complete unawareness of the ways in
which his behaviour was abusive. In the Divisional Court’s view, such an
inference is inconsistent with Dr. Peirovy having been found guilty of criminal
assault on two of the complainants.
In my opinion, this basis of the court is also flawed. The Discipline
Committee’s possible inference was not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for
simple assault. Simple assault contemplates an unwanted touching. The
Discipline Committee found that Dr. Peirovy deliberately touched the
complainants in areas that were medically unjustified and that the complainants
had not consented to the touching. This is sufficient to support the simple
assault convictions. Such inferences are not inconsistent with the finding that
Dr. Peirovy lacked understanding with respect to appropriate boundaries,
patient consent, and sensitivity to how patients had perceived him. Clearly,
there was touching by Dr. Peirovy in a manner that had not been consented to. A
sexual motivation need not be proven to support a conviction for simple assault.
The
Divisional Court then expressed its view that Dr. Peirovy’s motivation could
have been nothing other than sexual. It stated that the Discipline Committee
had made such a finding in the liability phase of the hearing and then
contradicted itself in its sentencing reasons. The Divisional Court explained
that it would be unreasonable for the Discipline Committee to rule at the
sentencing phase that Dr. Peirovy did not understand his conduct to be sexual
abuse after having found that an objective observer would have considered that
it constituted a violation of the patients’ sexual integrity.
The
difficulty with the Divisional Court’s position is that it reflects a
misunderstanding of the nuanced findings made by the Discipline Committee and
misconstrues the objective test articulated in Chase.
The
objective test that led to the Discipline Committee’s finding of sexual abuse
turned on the perspective of a reasonable observer and did not go so far as to
attribute subjective sexual motivation to Dr. Peirovy. As set out earlier, the
Discipline Committee was not able to make any clear finding as to the presence
or absence of sexual motivation in Dr. Peirovy’s conduct. It was not required
to do so in the circumstances of this case, where it found that the sexual
integrity of the patients had been violated because private and sensitive areas
of the body had been touched without the patients’ consent and without medical
necessity. Nevertheless, in fashioning the appropriate penalty, the Discipline
Committee was careful to note that a degree of prurient interest could not be
completely ruled out. This made clear that it took this possibility into
account in designing the penalty imposed.
It may well be that the conclusions and inferences of the
court differed from those reached and made by the Discipline Committee are
possible, however the standard of reasonableness is satisfied so long as the
explanation given for the conclusion is reasonable even if it is not one that
the reviewing court found compelling.
There has to be a determination as to whether the
Divisional Court chose and applied the correct standard of review. If that was
not the case, then there has to be an assessment of the administrative body’s
decision in light of the correct standard of review with respect to
reasonableness.
In this case, the Divisional Court chose the correct standard
of review. However, in my view, the Divisional Court not only erred in its
understanding of the evidence and of the reasons of the Discipline Committee,
it effectively sought to retry the case in a manner inconsistent with the
proper application of the standards of review. This is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Dunsmuir, that a reviewing court must
do more than simply cite the correct standard of review. It must apply it and
refrain from substituting its own view for that of the tribunal. The reviewing
court must resist the temptation to place itself in the position of the
decision-maker of first instance and compare the decision it would have made
against the decision actually made at first instance as this approach is prone
to undue conclusions of unreasonableness.
There were no inconsistent
findings of fact warranting intervention by the Divisional Court. It subjected
the reasons of the Discipline Committee to excessive scrutiny, rejecting the
reasonable, available findings made by the Discipline Committee and arriving at
different factual findings based on its improper reassessment of the
evidence.
The Divisional Court’s second
basis for allowing the appeal was that the Discipline Committee imposed an unfit
penalty. As I will explain, the Divisional Court’s analysis was flawed. First,
it misunderstood the Discipline Committee’s reasons and misapplied the
reasonableness standard of review. As the Divisional Court properly stated, “a
penalty decision of such a tribunal is at the heart of its discretion and is
due great deference”. (The power to make its own decisions) Nevertheless, the
Divisional Court in effect simply substituted its view of what might constitute
an appropriate penalty and did not defer to the Discipline Committee’s decision
as was required. Furthermore, the penalty imposed was not manifestly unfit but
represented the Discipline Committee’s careful consideration of all relevant
factors and was within the range of reasonable outcomes.
For an Administration decision to be overturned by a
reviewing court, the Discipline Committee would have had to make an error in principle
or the penalty had to have been clearly unfit.
To be clearly unfit, the
penalty must fall outside of the range of reasonableness. A reasonable penalty
will be guided by proportionality and an assessment of the range of appropriate
penalties dependent upon the facts of each case, and guided by penalties
imposed in other similar cases.
The
Discipline Committee considered a number of its previous decisions involving
the sexual abuse of patients. The factual scenarios in those cases were, like
Dr. Peirovy’s case, disturbing. However, they showed that the penalty imposed on
Dr. Peirovy was in line with those that have been imposed in Ontario. In fact, a
six-month suspension has been imposed for sexual misconduct more egregious than
the misconduct at issue in Dr. Peirovy’s case.
The
penalty imposed by the Discipline Committee was carefully tailored to the
circumstances of this particular case, and fit comfortably within the range of
penalties imposed in other similar or more serious cases of sexual abuse of
patients. It was based on forensic psychiatric evidence accepted by the Discipline
Committee as well as the evidence it heard during the liability phase. It also
took into account the progress shown by Dr. Peirovy in addressing some of
the concerns. Further, following the lodging of the complaints, Dr. Peirovy had
practiced with supervision for about five years without any incident.
The
Ontario Court of Appeal later ruled that the decision of the Divisional Court
was erroneous and subsequently invalid.
For
these reasons, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal Of Dr. Prirovy and restored
the penalty imposed by the Discipline Committee. It awarded Dr. Peirovy his
costs in the amounts agreed. Those amounts are $15,000 for the appeal, $1,500
for the application for leave to appeal, and $the 7,500 in the Divisional
Court, all of which are inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.
If
this doctor hadn’t acted in a sexually abusive manner against his patients in
the first place, he wouldn’t have had to endure the embarrassment he brought
upon himself and what he initially paid his
lawyer for his appeals.
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