Is  Canada’s  new  law  on  terrorism   justified?

 

 

Canadians are facing the reality that there are members of the Canadian society who are radical Islamists who prefer to deal with their complaints by indulging in acts of terrorism rather than by argument. Canadians are fed up with these kinds of people who would rather kill human beings than deal with them in more reasonable ways. Some of them prefer to leave Canada and join radical Islamists and kill people in other countries and some of them would rather remain in Canada and kill innocent people in Canada.

         

The government of Canada has had enough of these sub-humans and has decided to bring in a law in our Criminal Code that will make it easier for the authorities to deal with these kinds of low-life one finds at the bottom of the rhetorical scum-ridden pond of human refuse. 

 

It presented to Parliament Bill S-7, which is an Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act. Both Houses of Parliament approved the Act and now it is part of the Criminal Code.

 

The new law amends section 7(2) of the Criminal Code which now describes acts or omissions in relation to aircraft, airports and air navigation systems that have taken place outside Canada, and which, by operation of section 7(2) and section 83.01(1)(a) of the Code, constitute terrorist activity.

 

What this means is that if someone on a passenger plane or any other plane commits an act which can damage the plane or harm someone seriously or who high jacks the plane can now be treated as a terrorist and be subjected to punishment as a terrorist. It doesn’t matter where in the world the act is committed (other than Canada) and it doesn’t matter if the plane is in the air or on the ground.

 

The new law introduces new terrorism offences to Part II.1 of the Criminal Code prohibiting individuals from leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purpose of committing certain terrorism offences.

 

 

The Canadian  authorities may find that aspect of the law a hard nut to crack. The government may have to ask the courts to make a determination as to what evidence is needed to satisfy the authorities that a suspect is going to another country to commit acts of terrorism.

 

What kind of evidence would be suitable? Would Internet browsing at Islamic radical blogs, newspapers and magazines be sufficient? Would having visited a country that is rife with radical Islamic terrorists be sufficient? Would communicating in any manner with an insurgent or radical Islamist be sufficient? Would browsing through the Internet in search of information about bomb making be sufficient. And what would really be challenging is, would a report from another government about the suspicion of the individual be sufficient? There have been instances when such reports were totally wrong.

 

The new law amends the definition of ‘special operational information’ found in the Security of Information Act to ensure that the identity of confidential sources currently being used by the government is considered ‘special operational information’ under that Act.

 

Previously, the government withheld the names of informants in order to protect them. Does this amendment mean that their names can be given to the lawyers representing clients charged with terrorism? If so, then the sources of information may dry up.

 

With respect to electronic surveillance, the Anti-terrorism Act amended the Code’s wiretap provisions so that the investigative powers introduced in 1997 to make it easier to use electronic surveillance against criminal organizations, could also be used to investigate the terrorism offences.

 

This change includes extending the period of validity of a wiretap authorization from 60 days to up to one year when police are investigating a terrorism offence. It also includes permitting a delay of up to three years in notifying a target after surveillance has taken place, as opposed to the 90-day period that is applicable for other criminal offences.

 

This latter change makes a lot of sense when you consider that investigating terrorism is generally a time-consuming exercise and investigators don’t want terrorists being tipped off by the authorities investigating them when they have not completed their investigations.

 

The Criminal Code provisions in the past only allowed peace officers to apply for, and for judges to issue, a DNA warrant for the seizure of bodily substances during criminal investigations of certain offences such as murder. The Code has now been extended to apply to those being investigated in relation to as well as those convicted of terrorism offences.  

 

Clause 14 of Bill S-7 adds four new offences found in clauses 6 to 8 of the bill to section 183 of the Criminal Code. Section 183 defines the terms used in Part VI of the Code, which, among other things, gives peace officers the ability to apply to judges for warrants to intercept private communications of individuals when there are reasonable grounds to believe they have committed or will commit certain offences such as acts of terrorism. By adding references to sections 83.181, 83.191, 83.201, and 83.202 of the Code to section 183, clause 14 ensures that wiretap provisions in the Code applicable to criminal organization and other terrorism offences found in the Code also apply for four new terrorism offences.

 

Bill S-7 increases the sentence for harbouring and concealing someone who has committed a terrorism offence. I have always considered that anyone who harbours a terrorist is also a terrorist. I think that there should be a minimum sentence that automatically kicks in so that the judges have no other choice but to award at least the minimum sentence and nothing less. The new law states that the minimum sentence is increased from 10 and 14 years. In order to be guilty of the offence of harbouring and concealing, one must harbour or conceal the individual in question for the purpose of enabling him or her to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity.

 

Clause 9 also amends section 83.23 of the Criminal Code to create a distinction between situations where a person harbours or conceals someone whom they know has carried out a terrorist activity and situations and where a person harbours or conceals someone whom they know is likely to carry out a terrorist activity.   

 

Section 83.28 deals with bringing individuals who may have information about a terrorism offence before a judge for an investigative hearing. The objective is not to prosecute an individual for a Criminal Code offence, but to gather information. Under the provision, a peace officer, with the prior consent of the Attorney General, can apply to a superior court or a provincial court judge for an order to gather information under the following conditions: that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorism offence has or will be committed; that there are reasonable grounds to believe that information concerning the offence or the whereabouts of a suspect is likely to be obtained as a result of the order; and that reasonable attempts have been made to obtain such information by other means without success.

 

 

If the application granted, such a court order would compel a person to attend a hearing to answer questions on examination under oath and could include instructions for the person to bring along anything in his or her possession.

 

In addition, section 83.28 states that any person ordered to attend an investigative hearing is entitled to retain and instruct counsel. The person will be required to answer questions, and may only refuse to do so based on the laws relating to disclosure or privilege. For example, a person being questioned cannot tell the court what his or her spouse said but that person can be ordered to say what the spouse did.

 

The presiding judge will rule on any such refusal. No one called to such a hearing can refuse to answer a question or to produce something in his or her possession on the grounds of self-incrimination. However, any information or testimony provided by an individual during an investigative hearing cannot be used against him or her in a subsequent proceeding except in relation to prosecuting him or her for perjury or for providing subsequent contradictory evidence in a later proceeding.

 

The danger facing the person who incriminates himself in his testimony can however be used by the police to investigate that person’s role in the terrorist act.  As an example, a man admits that he robbed a bank. That admission in court cannot be used against him if he is later tried for bank robbery. However the police can then show a photo of the man to a bank teller and if the teller recognizes the man as the bank robber, he can then be charged with bank robbery.

 

If a witness refuses to testify or answer a question, that person can be found in contempt and sent to jail.

 

Clause 10 of Bill S-7 also re-enacts section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, dealing with recognizance with conditions and preventive arrest to prevent a potential terrorist attack, with substantially similar provisions. Under this re-enacted section, with the prior consent of the Attorney General, a peace officer may lay information (complaint) before a provincial court judge if he or she believes that a terrorist act will be carried out and suspects that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions or the arrest of a person is required to prevent it. The judge may order the person to appear before any provincial court judge.

 

As you can see, Canada is taking greater steps to fight terrorism however; I don’t think this is enough.

 

I believe that anyone who leaves Canada to go to another country for the sole purpose of joining a terrorist organization or to obtain training in a terrorist training camp should lose his right to Canadian citizenship. If the evidence is strong enough against him, his passport should be rescinded. If he wishes to return to Canada, he can go to a Canadian embassy and they will give him a temporary one with a two-week time limit which will only permit him to return to Canada. When he arrives in Canada, he should be arrested at the airport and tried for his terrorist acts. If found guilty, he should be punished by imprisonment. Before he is released from prison, he should have a citizenship hearing and if the authorities feel that his role in terrorism was serious, then his citizenship should be revoked and he should be kept in prison until he obtains a United Nations Refugee passport. Once received, he should then be kicked out of Canada. I also believe that the same procedure should apply for a Canadian citizen (born here or nationalized) who commits a terrorist act in Canada since that person is declaring war on Canada.  Once his citizenship is revoked, he can apply for a United Nations Refugee passport and can go to a country that will accept him.  

 

Admittedly, my proposal is extremely harsh but ask yourself this rhetorical question; suppose a Canadian citizen who was born in Canada becomes a terrorist and plants a bomb on a sidewalk when you are nearby and the bomb blows up and you lose both of your legs and your arms. After he is eventually released from prison, would you really want this terrorist to remain in Canada?  Would you not believe that when he, as a terrorist, he is in fact, declaring war on Canada? Why should a Canadian terrorist who plants a bomb on a Canadian street continue to be considered as a Canadian citizen when he is declaring war on the country of his birth or accepted him as a nationalized citizen?